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Abstract
Today, railroad companies transport many varieties of dangerous goods (DG). Train
derailments, especially those involving DG, can be catastrophic in terms of loss of life
and environmental damage. In North America, the transportation of DG is governed
by regulations published by the Canadian and United State’s governments. While the
regulation is important in terms of providing overall guidelines, they do not address the
problem of optimally positioning DG cars in terms of their potential for derailment and
the associated risks. Currently, most rail yard operations do not consider the potential
effect of the position of DG cars on the risk of derailment.
This research is concerned with the problem of how to place DG cars in a train in the
train assembly process so that the overall derailment risk can be minimized. The approach
considers both the probability of railway cars derailing en route by position as well as
the time associated with additional operations in the rail yard. This work has resulted
in a useful decision support tool for assisting rail yard operation managers to achieve an
optimum trade-off between derailment risk and operating costs in assembling trains. The
merits of this new car placement model are illustrated through a case study of a real railway
corridor that connects Barstow Yard in California to Corwith Yard in Chicago over 2100
miles and involves a range of track features. The case study demonstrates that the proposed
risk minimization strategy could be implemented with minimal rail yard operation cost.
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Rail accidents can be classified into three main types: derailments, collisions (including
head on, rear end, and side), and highway railway grade crossing accidents. As illustrated
in Figure 1.1, train derailments account for greater than 50% of all train accidents in
Canada and the US. Train derailments also represent a significant share of personal injury
and property damage every year [47]. For instance according to the United States Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), as many as 300 personal injuries occur and the related
property damage costs can be as high as $300 million per year in the US [9].
The potential threat to the public and the environment is even more significant when
derailments involve cars carrying dangerous goods (hazardous materials). This threat
depends on the nature of the dangerous goods (DG) involved and their propensity for
fires, explosions, and toxic impacts. According to FRA statistics, on average, $500,000 in
direct property damage results from a derailment involving DG [9]. This damage is five
times greater than if DG are not involved. The major threat posed by DG involvement is
related to personal injury and long-term environmental damages.
Two recent train derailments involving DG illustrate the extent of personal injury and
environmental impact possible. In February 2003, a freight train carrying DG derailed
in Ontario, resulting in the derailment of seven cars that contained liquefied petroleum
gas. The derailed cars produced an extensive fire that burned for three days. Smoke
from the fire resulted in significant degradation of in the air quality in the vicinity of the
derailment. More than 300 residents had to be evacuated, and two crew members sustained
major injuries [46].
In January 2005, a freight train derailed in South Carolina, involving a numbers of DG
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Figure 1.1: Rail accidents by type in the US and Canada (Source:[9, 48])
Nine people died, hundreds were injured, and about 6000 residents had to be evacuated.
The total damage from the derailment exceeded $6.9 million [21].
US railroads carry approximately 1.8 million carloads of DG annually (approximately
5% of total freight rail traffic). Thus every day, thousands of DG are moved by rail across
the US [44]. In Canada, approximately 500,000 carloads of DG are shipped annually, or
12% of total freight shipped by rail nationally [47]. Figure 1.2 shows that, based on the
FRA database, DG cars were involved in half of the total number of derailments of trains
carrying DG in the US in the period 1997-2006.
Recently, in response to a number of derailments involving DG in British Columbia
(e.g., the release of sodium hydroxide into the Cheakamus River), Alberta and Quebec,
Transport Canada announced a formal review of the Railway Safety Act to consider ways
to manage and reduce the risk associated with the transport of DG [23]. This review
will address all of these challenges by identifying possible changes to the Act that would
strengthen Canada’s regulatory regime, including train make-up issues.
In the US, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1994 recommended an in-
vestigation of the placement of DG cars in general freight trains in order to reduce the
potential of DG cars involvment in derailments. Section 111 of the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Authorization Act (P.L. 103-311) states that
“The Secretary of Transportation shall conduct a study of existing practices
regarding the placement of cars on trains, with particular attention to the


































Figure 1.2: Share of car derailments involving DG from FRA 1997-2006 (Source:[9])
the Secretary shall consider whether such placement practices increase the risk
of derailment, hazardous materials spills, or tank ruptures or have any other
adverse effect on safety . . .”
Recently, the Association of American Railroads [43] underlined railroad companies
desire to reduce the risk of DG transportation. The association suggested that risks as-
sociated with the transport of DG could be in the billions of dollars. A number of state
agencies in the US have gone even further to consider banning such rail shipments within
their jurisdictions [45].
Train derailments are an important safety concern, and they become even more critical
when DG are involved. There are two ways of addressing this concern:
1. Improving track infrastructure (track, switches, etc.) and rolling stock (cars, loco-
motives), which are major factors contributing to the occurrence of derailments.
2. Improving train operational strategies so that the total risk of derailments is reduced.
This research is concerned with the second approach, with a specific focus on mitigating
derailment risk through improved DG marshalling practice in the train assembly process.
3
1.2 Train Assembly Process and Marshalling of DG
Railway Cars
This section presents the current marshalling strategies involving DG as adopted in Canada
and the US. The safety problems associated with the current situation are underscored.
This review is to justify the proposed model introduced in Chapter 2.
A rail yard is a system of tracks used for making up (assembling) trains, storing cars,
and other purposes[29]. In North America there are two types of rail yards, flat yards and
hump yards. In hump yards, a specially built hill known as a hump is used for sorting
cars, while in flat yards, yard engines sort cars by flat switching [38]. “Switching is the
operation that separates two adjacent sets of cars, and sends the sets to their assigned
classification tracks.”[28, 38]
Figure 1.3 illustrates the four basic operational stages involved in a typical rail yard
train make-up process:
1. The train arrives at the receiving track, where cars (tagged by destination) are in-
spected. After inspection, they are queued for humping.
2. In a conventional hump yard operation, a train is pushed to the hump for disassembly
on a “first come, first served” basis. On the hump, cars are cut from the rest of the
train one by one and shunted to their respective classification track, with all cars on
each track sharing a common destination.
3. Once a full block of cars (all going to a common destination) is assembled on the
classification track, the cars are checked for position violations such as the inadequate
separation of DG cars from train personnel and unsafe distance between incompatible
DG materials. In the current train assembly process, a yard engine is used to cut a
specific number of cars from the classification track to ensure that these concerns are
satisfied.
4. Once the full blocks of cars have been assembled in the classification yard, a yard
engine shunts each block to a departure track. The order of blocks in the train on
the departure track is determined by the sequence of intermediate and final destina-
tion points along the corridor. On the departure track, each train is attached to a
locomotive, and a final inspection is carried out prior to departure.
In rail yard operations, the key step in train assembly takes place on the classification
tracks and is sometimes referred to as the pull-down process. Pull-down crews have two
main tasks: coupling cars in the classification yard and pulling them to the departure track
to form the outbound train [60].
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Figure 1.3: Hump yard schematic
Figure 1.4 illustrates the train assembly classification process, which consists of catego-
rizing blocks of cars based on destination. The main problem addressed in the classification
process is marshalling, which determines the specific position of individual cars in a train
with a key consideration of ensuring sufficient separation of incompatible DG cars from each
other. Marshalling or building a train is the process by which a yard engine (locomotive)
assembles cars into a train.
The position of DG in a train has a major effect on the risk associated with derailment,
more specifically,
• The involvement of DG cars in derailments increases the damages associated with
these derailments. The extent of damages is a function of the type of DG material.
• For multiple DG car derailments, the location of incompatible materials near each
other increases the extent of possible damage.
The probability of involving DG cars in a derailment can be decreased by systematically
placing theses cars in positions that are less prone to derailing for a given route. Therefore,
prior knowledge of train derailment patterns can help to improve marshalling operations
involving DG. Furthermore, it is important from a practical point of view to understand
the cost and efficiency implications of different marshalling strategies as the safest strategy
may not be justified if train assembly costs are prohibitively high.
1.3 The Research Problem
As discussed previously, the basic problem with existing train marshalling practice is that
it does not consider derailment risk by car position for a given train travelling along a
5
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Figure 1.4: Current classification operation procedure
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specific route. Hence, there is a possibility that DG cars could be placed in positions that
are more prone to derailments.
Neither the Canadian or US regulations consider the relationship between DG car
positions and derailment risk [22, 50]. Furthermore, although the specification advised in
the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID) are important in terms of
providing overall guidelines, the problem of optimally positioning DG cars in terms of their
potential for derailment is not addressed [35].
Over the last two decades, various studies have been conducted on train derailments. In
1979, the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center published a study [34] suggesting
that the front of a train is more prone to derail under loaded conditions, thus implying
that DG cars should be placed closer to the rear. A similar study by Battelle [57] divided
the train into segments and then evaluated the probability of derailments for each segment.
This study also provided a risk-based ranking of incompatible materials to determine the
worst-case combinations of different types of DG being placed in proximity to one another.
A study by FRA [40] concluded that empty cars should not be placed in the front; that
is, the preferred position for loaded cars (DG and non-DG) should be the front part of the
train. The Canadian Institute of Guided Ground Transport (CIGGT) [32] investigated the
risk to train crews as related to position and separation distance of DG in conventional
freight trains based on Canadian derailment data. This study offered no recommendations
as to preferred low-risk placement of DG cars along the train.
Saccomanno and El-Hage [53] established derailment profiles by position for shipments
of DG. The main focus of this research was to determine the probability of derailment
for each position along a given train and develop a model to predict the number of cars
derailing by train derailment cause. The study did not explicitly consider train assembly
operations in the rail yard.
More recently, Anderson and Barkan [11] studied derailment probabilities at an ag-
gregate level using recent FRA data. A recent study by English et al., [36] developed a
derailment model at the disaggregate level based on the Canadian Railway Occurrence
Data System (RODS). Another study by Bagheri [13] evaluated the risks associated with
DG cars in sidings. These studies failed to explicitly consider DG placement risks in rail
yard marshaling operations.
In summary, the research to date does not provide adequate scientific evidence on the
risk implications associated with DG car placement along the train consist. In the absence
of such evidence, current practice in marshaling DG cars has been guided more by rail
yard assembly costs and efficiencies than by strategies to counter the underlying risks.
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1.4 Research Objectives
The focus of this research is to investigate how the position of different types of DG cars
in a train affects their chances of being involved in a derailment and how the relative
placement of different types of materials in a train affects the consequence of a derailment.
The intent is to reduce the risk of DG involvement in train derailments by reducing the
probability of any car carrying DG being involved in a derailment block. This study has
four specific objectives:
1. to evaluate different risk-based approaches for effective marshalling of DG cars along
a train consist.
2. to develop a comprehensive risk minimization model for application that incorporates
rail-yard train assembly and cost/time constraints.
3. to apply the model to several representative shipment scenarios (mix of DG, mix
of destinations, different transhipment points, etc.) and investigate the effects of
different marshalling strategies for typical shipment scenarios.
4. to apply the model to a case study corridor with known shipment volumes and
shipment destinations and compare the case study results to existing marshalling
regulations and make appropriate recommendations.
The scope of the study is limited to train assembly issues at a rail yard. Despite this
focus, the model will account for the train derailment risk estimated along a given route
for different DG shipments. The research is concerned only with conventional freight train
assembly and does not consider unit trains, which are not subject to assembly at rail yards.
Conventional freight trains normally consist of a mix of various types of freight, including
different types of DG with different destination points. In this analysis, the primary safety
concern is derailments as opposed to other types of train accidents, such as collisions and
accidents at highway-railway crossings. Furthermore, while derailments can influence cars
prior to the point of derailment, this research is limited to derailed cars situated after that
point.
DG risk in this research refers to a potential derailment of cars carrying some type of DG
along a given route or route segment. Subsequent events such as releases, fires,explosions,
etc. are not within the scope of this analysis. Furthermore, it is assumed that the effect on
total risk resulting from the interaction of incompatible DG materials derailing in proximity
to one another can be ignored, such that all derailing DG cars are treated equally in terms
of the potential threat they pose to the population and environment.
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis
This thesis is comprised of six chapters:
Chapter 2: DG Car Placement Model Framework
Chapter 2 describes a model framework to formulate the DG car marshalling problem,
focusing on introduction of two required components of the proposed model: an in-transit
risk model and rail yard marshalling model.
Chapter 3: In-transit Risk Model
Chapter 3 presents the in-transit risk model as the first component of the study framework.
This model provides an estimate of the risk of derailment by position along a route segment
for a given mix of DG and non-DG cars making up a train consist. The following four
sequential components are discussed in this chapter: causes of train derailment, probability
of train derailment, point of derailment, and number of cars derailing.
Chapter 4: Rail Yard Marshalling Model
Chapter 4 introduces the rail yard marshalling model as the second component of the study
framework and includes practical operations restrictions such as an estimation of the rail
yard train assembly costs (or processing time) for each train and the DG placement strategy
or plan.
Chapter 5: Case Study Application
Chapter 5 illustrates the merits of this new model through a case study abstracted from
a real railway corridor. The corridor connects Barstow Yard in California to Corwith
Yard in Chicago over 2100 miles and involves a range of track features. The case study
demonstrates that the proposed risk-minimization strategy could be implemented with a
minimum overhead in terms of rail yard operation costs (time).
Chapter 6: Conclusions
Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions, with recommendations for future research.
It should be noted that this thesis does not include a separate literature review chapter.




This research proposes a train assembly model that differs from past models in its consid-
eration of two important points: the risk of DG cars being involved in a derailment for
a specific route; the cost of marshalling at a rail yard. This chapter presents the overall
framework proposed to formulate the underlying DG-car-marshalling problem.
The focus of this study is on the classification process at rail yards where humping
operations are completed and cars are separated on the classification track based on their
destination. In cases involving DG cars, the yard engine is required to reassemble the order
the cars in blocks that prevent any violation associated with DG. The yardmaster in the
tower is responsible for sending the tasks to the yard engine. In addition, based on current
regulations regarding the position of DG cars, another question should be answered in this
study: How should the yard engine change the position of DG cars in the train consist in
order to reduce the risk of a derailment?
This research problem has been stated as an optimization model which is the main part
of this research and addresses the problem of which cars should be placed in a given block
and which block should be placed in a given departing train. Minimizing total risk, taking
operational limitations into consideration, is the objective of the optimization model, which
calculates total risk by summing the risk of each car and then determining the combination
of cars that results in the least risk and cost.
The optimization model considered in this study consists of two major models: an in-
transit risk model (objective function) and a rail yard marshalling model. The in-transit
risk model provides an estimate of the risk of derailment by position along a route segment
for a given mix of DG and non-DG cars making up the train consist. The rail yard
marshalling model introduces practical operations restrictions. For instance, obtaining
the rail yard train assembly costs (or processing time) for each train and DG placement
strategy is discussed in this model. The model framework is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: DG car placement framework
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Before formulating the problem, one must know the inputs and outputs of the model.
The inputs are 1) the rolling stock characteristics such as the number of cars in each block;
the total number of cars, which determines the train length; the number of DG cars in each
block; the types of DG in each block; and 2) the route attributes, such as the minimum
radius of curvature, maximum longitudinal gradient, and maximum supperelevation. The
outputs are 1) the order of cars in each block and 2) the order of blocks in each train consist.
Ideally, after running the model and obtaining the optimal order of cars and blocks, the
yardmaster will send the output to a yard engine to change the positions.
2.1 Model Framework
This framework (Figure 2.1) begins with the arrival of a train at the hump yard with DG
and non-DG cars tagged for specific destinations. These cars are disengaged and humped
to the classification track on a first-come, first-served (FCFS) basis. Each classification
track contains cars that are coupled together based on a common destination point (a
block) along the route. Once a block has been completed with the desired number of cars,
a yard engine shunts it to the departure track, where it is combined with other blocks
to make up a train, and which is subsequently inspected prior to departure. The order
of blocks on a given train is set with respect to the sequence of intermediate destination
points along a route, such that the block assigned to the closest destination is shunted to
the front of the train, followed by the block assigned to the next closest destination, and
so on until the final destination block is connected to the train.
The order of cars in the classification track is currently set on an FCFS basis that does
not explicitly consider DG derailment risk from position along the route. In consequence,
DG cars may not be excluded from those positions that are more prone to derailment.
Under current regulations [22, 50], a yard engine may be used to insert a designated number
of non-DG buffer cars to separate DG cars from train operating personnel in, for instance
the locomotive or caboose. Current regulations may also take into account possible train
instability problems caused by locating loaded and empty cars near one another.
The DG car placement framework considered in this research envisions the introduction
of an in-transit risk model that assigns DG cars to those positions along the train that
have the lowest probability of derailing along the different route segments. This strategy
serves to modify the FCFS approach currently in use at the interface between the hump
and the classification track. The modified DG placement strategy is implemented by the
yard engine on instruction from the hump controller. It is proposed that this strategy be
introduced at the interface between the hump and the classification track prior to these
cars being shunted to the departure track.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the DG car placement strategy receives input from two
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sources: 1) DG and non-DG shipment volumes by intermediate and final destination points
along a given route and 2) route attributes and operating and design features by segment.
The first input is used to estimate the number of DG and non-DG cars traversing a given
segment of track, while the second input is used to estimate car derailment probabilities
by position for each route segment. Presumably, the yard engine plan will include the full
set of marshalling instructions required to modify DG car placement based on minimizing
in-transit derailment risk. The in-transit risk model in Figure 2.1 estimates three specific
probabilities: train derailment, point of derailment (POD) by position, and number of cars
derailing for different PODs. Within the scope of this study, the number of cars derailing
reflects the basic unit of “in-transit risk”, such that, the risk consequence is 1 for every
DG car derailing and 0 otherwise.
2.2 Modeling the Marshaling of DG Railway Cars(MDG)
This section describes the new approach to formulating the problem: the Marshalling of
DG - Two levels model (MDG2). In this model, the decision is divided into two sequential
problems. The first is to find the best combination of cars within each block, while the
second is to determine the order of blocks.
Finding the optimal position for DG cars along a train consist is a combinatorial prob-
lem with the objective of minimizing total risk caused by derailment and operating costs.
The model divides the marshalling problem into two levels of decision problems. The
first is to find the order of cars within each block (i.e., those with the same destination),
and the second attempts to find the order of blocks in the train consists. The optimal order
of cars in a block depends on the probability of derailment and the incompatibility of any
DG involved, and this probability in turn depends on the order of blocks. As a result,
these two optimization problems are interrelated and must be solved together iteratively.
To illustrate the problem, a train with three destinations is considered: block B consist-
ing of 30 cars, ten of which contain DG is located in the first position, block C consisting of
50 cars, 20 DG in the second, and block A consisting of 20 cars, five DG at the third. Under
the assumption that there is no difference between DG in terms of the level of hazard, the
possible combinations are shown in Figure 2.2. This large sized problem is fundamentally
difficult to solve.
The probability of derailment for each position can be calculated. The best combination
can be identified by minimizing the total risk under the incompatibility constraint. This
step repeats for the next assumed order of blocks. Note that changing the sequence of
the blocks will change the best corresponding combination of cars in each block. For all
possible combinations of blocks (Figure 2.3), this procedure repeats.
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Figure 2.2: Possible combinations of cars in each block
The second level develops the order of the blocks.
Block C Block B Block A
Block B Block CBlock A
Block BBlock CBlock A
3! = 6 
Front
Figure 2.3: Possible combinations of the blocks
At this level, each block has a corresponding risk value calculated in the first level.
Thus, the risk of a whole train consist is the summation of the risks of all blocks. The
second level finds the order of blocks with the minimum accumulated risk. More details
are presented in Figure 2.4.
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The data sources for this study can be classified into two groups: the data sources required
to update the previous derailment studies and the data sources needed for establishing
different application scenarios and marshalling strategies. The latter required interviews
and site visits to rail yards. For updating the previous models, three basic sources of data
are used:
1. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) train accident database, published an-
nually in the United States.
2. The Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) train accident database (RODS)
3. Reports on selected derailments and collisions produced by the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB) in the US and by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB)
in Canada.
The FRA provides information on the type, causes, consequences, and mitigating cir-
cumstances of train accidents experienced annually nation-wide in the US for the period
1975-2007. These data are readily available for downloading from the FRA, Office of Safety
Analysis Web Site. One problem with the FRA train derailment database is that it does
not include information on all cars involved in a derailment. As a result the payload of
each car in a train consist can not be determined. For Canadian derailment data, the
RODS database is available for the period 1983-2005. The problem with RODS tables is
that most of the cells are empty. Thus obtaining more information requires reviews of a
number of NTSB and TSB accident investigation reports for the period 1993-2005. The
NTSB database contained 101 investigative reports, compared to 163 reports in the TSB
database.
Interviews and observations are two main ways to evaluate current operations and es-
tablish application scenarios and marshalling strategies. Various site visits were conducted
to gain a general understanding of rail yard operations and included Taschereau Yard
(Montreal Intermodal Terminal) in June 2006, Agincourt Yard (Canadian Pacific Railway)
in Toronto in July 2007 and April 2009, Liucun South Yard (Datong-Qinhuangdao Railway
in China) in June 2009, Alyth Yard (Canadian Pacific Railway) in Calgary in August 2009,
and finally, the Network Management Center (NMC) of the Canadian Pacific Railway in
August 2009.
In addition, interviews (by telephone, personal, email) were conducted to obtain rail-
road management and crew feedback. Finally, two classes were attended in the Railway
Conductor Program (T151) at George Brown College in Toronto (the“Switching and Mar-





This chapter presents the In-Transit Risk Model as the first main component of the pro-
posed model (Figure 2.1). The following four sequential components are discussed: causes
of train derailment, probability of train derailment, point of derailment, and number of
cars derailing.
3.1 In-transit Risk Components
There are different ways to express risk, especially as it relates to DG in transport. Some
authors define risk as a function of probability and consequence of the undesirable event
[39]. In addition risk has been expressed in a more comprehensive as an F-N representation
of risk. Providing a more complete definition of risk overall likely covers from low frequency
high consequence to high frequency low consequence. Recently researchers have explained
F-N representation of risk in terms of confidence interval to refine uncertainty [54]. More
common definition of risk is the product of both the probability and the consequence of the
event [27, 33]. In this research, risk is defined as the probability of derailment multiplied
by the consequence.
In-transit risk in this study refers to a potential derailment of cars carrying some type of
DG along a given route or route segment. The in-transit risk model provides an estimate
of the risk of derailment by position along a route segment for a given mix of DG and
non-DG cars making up a train consist. Within the scope of this study, the number of cars
derailing reflects the basic unit of “in-transit risk”; therefore, the actual severity of a car
derailing is not explicitly considered.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the components involved in the in-transit risk model. To develop
derailment probability profiles for trains along specific routes, four basic steps must be
taken:
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1. analysis of train derailments;
2. assessment of the potential causes of derailment;
3. analysis of the Point of Derailment (POD) along the train where derailments are
likely to begin;
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Figure 3.1: In-transit risk model components
The in-transit risk model inputs are
1. rolling stock characteristics, which include the number of cars in each block, the total
number of cars (the train length), the number of DG cars in each block, and the types
of DG in each block; and
2. route attributes, including the minimum radius of curvature, the maximum longitu-
dinal gradient, and the maximum supperelevation.
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The in-transit risk model output is the derailment risk for each DG car. Ideally, after
running the model and obtaining the optimum order of cars and blocks, the yardmaster
sends the output to a yard engine to order the cars optimally.
A comprehensive understanding of the above four elementary steps will facilitate the
presentation of the model framework in this research. As a result, each of these steps is
discussed after in-transit risk formulation.
3.2 In-transit risk formulation
In-transit risk requires the estimation of two constituent components, the point of derail-
ment (POD) and the number of cars derailing. The aim of the DG placement model is
to position DG cars along the train so that the route segment risk of derailment is mini-
mized. For a given train and route segment, this risk is summed over all positions; that is,
n∑
i=1
Ri, where Ri is the risk of derailment at position i. Ri is defined as the probability of
derailment at position i, Pi, multiplied by the consequence of derailment at position i, Ci,
that is,
Ri = Pi × Ci. (3.1)
The probability of derailment at position i (Pi) can be defined by
Pi = Pr(TD)× Pr(i |TD), (3.2)
where Pr(TD) is the probability of train derailment on a given route, and Pr(i |TD) is the




1 if a DG car occupies position i
0 otherwise.
The conditional probability of a car in position i derailing given that the train has derailed









Pr(k cars derailing |POD at position j)
]
. (3.3)
Pr(POD at position j) is the probability that derailment initiated at position j along a
given route segment. This probability depends on the cause of derailment and can be
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determined accordingly. Let g ∈ G represents a derailment cause such as track geometry;
then,




Pr(POD at position j |Cause g)× Pr(Cause g)
]
, (3.4)
where Pr(Cause g) is the probability of the derailment cause for the given route attributes
and rolling stock characteristics, and Pr(POD at position j |Cause g) is the probability of
POD at position j when the derailment cause is given.
Finally, the risk associated with each position i (as in Equation (3.1)) is simply the
product of Equation (3.2) and the placement of DG cars in this position, i.e.,
Ri = Pr(TD)× Pr(i |TD)× Ci . (3.5)
For a given route segment and n car train, the risk associated with all positions of the
train is estimated by summing Equation (3.5) for i = 1, . . . , n. As noted, only positions
occupied by DG cars contribute to this risk.
In this research, the total train segment risk serves as the objective function minimized
with respect to each DG placement strategy considered. More details about the total train
risk along a corridor are discussed in Appendix A.
3.3 Analysis of Train Derailments
Anderson and Barkan [11] show that the probability of a freight train derailing is a function
of exposure (distance traveled), train length, and track class (which indicates track quality).
Their resultant expression is given in Equation (3.6).
Pr(TD) = 1− e−distance×(RC×(train length)+RT ), (3.6)
where, Pr(TD) is derailment probability; RC is derailment rate per billion freight car-miles;
and RT is derailment rate per million freight train-miles.
Their model is based on aggregate data for accident rates for several track classes in
terms of the number of derailments per billion freight car-miles and number of derailments
per million freight train-miles. The probability of a train derailment is assumed to be a
function of the track and train operating characteristics along a given route segment.
The FRA classifies track into nine categories for passenger and freight trains based on
various quality and speed considerations (Table 3.1). Table 3.2 summarizes several train
derailment rates for different track classes. These rates are given in both train and car-mile
measures of exposure. This model (Equation (3.6)) is used as the probability of a train
derailment in this research.
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Table 3.1: FRA Track classification based on maximum speed (Source:[5])
Track Type Freight Train Passenger Train
Class 1 10 mph (16 km/h) 15 mph (24 km/h)
Class 2 25 mph (40 km/h) 30 mph (48 km/h)
Class 3 40 mph (64 km/h) 60 mph (97 km/h)
Class 4 60 mph (97 km/h) 80 mph (130 km/h)
Class 5 80 mph (130 km/h) 90 mph (140 km/h)
Class 6 110 mph (180 km/h)
Class 7 125 mph (201 km/h)
Class 8 160 mph (260 km/h)
Class 9 200 mph (320 km/h)
Table 3.2: Estimated accident rates by FRA track class: 1992 - 2001(Source:[11])
FRA track class X & 1 2 3 4 5 & 6
Derailments per million freight train miles 48.540 6.060 2.040 0.530 0.320
Derailments per billion freight car miles 720.100 92.700 31.500 7.800 4.900
3.4 Derailment Cause Analysis and Modeling
The first step in estimating Pr(POD at position j) in Equation (3.4) is obtaining the prob-
ability of derailment causes along each route segment (Pr(Cause g)). The assumption is
that derailment causes are a function of route attributes and rolling stock characteris-
tics. In this section, this assumption is validated through statistical analysis. A detailed
discussion of derailment cause distribution is provided (Figure 3.1).
This section has two specific objectives:
1. to evaluate the correlation between train derailment causes and route attributes and
rolling stock characteristics through log-linear analysis
2. to estimate the causes of train derailment for a given train and route
3.4.1 Previous Studies
Various studies have been conducted on train derailment causes. Arthur D. Little [7]
showed that train accidents were attributable to either car miles- or train miles-related
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causes. Train miles-related causes are independent of train length, which essentially con-
stitutes the number of train movements over a given track segment. For instance, “human
error” is a train miles-related cause. On the other hand, causes such as “track component
failures” and “equipment failures” are car miles- related causes. A similar study by Schafer
and Barkan [55] evaluated this grouping of accident causes through regression analysis of
US accidents for the period 1990 to 2005.
Another study by TranSys Research Ltd [36] analyzed Canadian derailment data to
explore equipment and track-related causes. Barkan et al., [19] studied the US FRA
mainline freight derailment records to investigate the link between various causes and
release of dangerous goods from tank cars. This study carries out a similar investigation
of FRA mainline fright derailment, for a different period (1997- 2006), which is presented
in Table 3.3. This table arranges different causes according to their frequency.
Nicolet and Gheorghe[42] showed that a railway car can be involved in a derailment
either by initiating a train derailment or by derailment due to the derailment of the cars
in front of it. Thus, in estimating the probability of derailment by position along a train,
two factors must be considered: (i) the point at which the train derailment begins (POD)
and (ii) the number of cars derailing after the point of derailment.
Previous studies [30, 51] showed that the point at which a train derailment begins is
affected by the cause of derailment. In addition, the numbers of cars involved in derailments
have been found to depend on the cause of derailment and the operating speed [57]. Hence,
to better understand the relationship between the POD and number of cars derailing, the
distribution of causes in derailment data needs to be established.
To estimate the distribution of causes, firstly, this assumption that the derailment
causes is a function of route attributes and rolling stock characteristics has been tested
through log-linear analysis. Also, this log-linear model has been used to estimate the
distribution of derailment causes (Pr(Cause g)).
According to an extensive literature review, previous studies generally neglect to con-
sider derailment causes according to rolling stock characteristics and route attributes.
In the next section, statistical analysis is conducted to estimate probabilities of derail-
ment causes given route attributes and rolling stock characteristics. The loglinear method
is used to evaluate dependency structure between the response variable “cause” and predic-
tors. The loglinear model is further be used to estimate conditional probability distribution
of causes give other factors.
3.4.2 Derailment Data Sources
The analyses in this section use a database of freight train derailments that happened in
the US from 1997-2006. The US Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) train accident
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database is assembled annually and provides information on the type of track, total damage,
and mitigating circumstances of individual train accidents experienced nation-wide. The
data are readily available for downloading from the FRA, Office of Safety Analysis Web
Site [9].
For the 10-year period under discussion (1997-2006), there are 38,393 records, but
this research is concerned with freight train derailments on mainlines. Moreover, another
limitation had to be added to omit some records where the numbers of locomotives are
more than three, so the number of records is 4,150.
The 389 distinctive causes listed in the FRA database are categorized into five major
cause groups, namely track, roadbed and structure (T); signal and communication (S);
mechanical and electrical failures (E); train operation-human factors (H); and miscellaneous
(M).
Each cause is represented as a code of length four, where the first space in the coding
scheme refers to one of the five aforementioned major cause groups. For instance, the
“Broken Rail” defect represented by T201 belongs to causes group T (track or roadbed
and structure), and 201 is a numeric label given by the FRA to distinguish this defect from
other track-related causes.
Contrary to the FRA, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) has used a different
cause grouping, which is defined by merging several FRA causes into one single cause, and
resulting in only 51 distinctive accident causes instead of the FRA’s 389 (Appendix B).
The AAR used codes of length three to distinguish different causes. The two first spaces
are numeric and the last one is one of the letters T, S, E, H, M introduced above. Following
[19, 51] the current study has used the AAR cause groupings since it has better resolution
for certain causes. Table 3.3 illustrates the fifteen most frequent accident cause groups and
the four broad categories that combine together the remaining cause groups (Track-TO,
Human Factor-HO, Equipment-EO, and Signal-01S).
3.4.3 Cause Grouping by Probability Distribution Fitting
Previous studies [53, 17, 16] showed that the point at which a train derailment begins
(POD) is affected by the cause of derailment. These studies took train length into account
for estimating the POD by normalizing the length in the range of 1 to 100 cars to obtain
the normalized points of derailment (NPOD) for different derailment causes. For instance,
for road bed defects, derailments occurred more likely in the front sections of the train
than in other sections. The main focus of this section is probability distribution fitting for
NPOD data.
In what follows, three steps have been used to model a dataset with a specific proba-
bility distribution: (i) determining the “best-fitting” distribution and (ii) estimating the
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parameters for that distribution, and (iii) testing the validity of the selected distribution.
To find the best fitting distribution for all 19 causes, a variety of probability distribu-
tions are fitted using the @Risk software package. P-values for the Chi-square tests are
calculated, and at level 0.05, the best fits for each accident cause is reported in Table 3.3.
As an example, for the “Broken Rails or Welds” cause (08T), five different types of dis-
tributions that have been fitted to NPOD frequencies are beta, triangle, uniform, exponen-
tial, and normal. Chi-Square tests were applied to test the validity of the aforementioned
distributions, and at level 0.05 only beta distribution was selected.
In a similar fashion, best-fit distributions were obtained for all 19 causes (Table 3.3).
The last column of the table shows which part of train is most likely be derailed because
of the associated cause. The accident causes with a beta distribution of α < 1 (and β > 1)
tend to initiate at the front. Those with α < 1 (and β < 1) tend to initiate at the front or
rear of the train. Those accident causes with triangular distribution have a lower limit a,
mode c, and upper limit b. For instance, when b = c for “track geometry”, the distribution
suggests that the rear end of a train is more likely to be derailed than other parts.
Table 3.3: Best fit POD distributions (F=Front, R=Rear end, E=Everywhere, M=Middle)
Cause Group Description Frequency Distribution with Parameters Train
08T Broken Rails or Welds 723 Beta (0.659, 1.139) F
04T Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gage) 359 Triangle(-0.174, 1.000, 1.000) R
03T Wide Gage 277 Beta (0.817, 0.976) FR
10E Bearing Failure (Car) 265 Uniform (0.005, 1.004) E
05T Buckled Track 180 Triangle(-0.136, 1.000, 1.000) R
04M Track-Train Interaction 163 Uniform (0.008, 1.006) E
12E Broken Wheels (Car) 145 Uniform (0.003, 1.007) E
03M Lading Problems 139 Uniform (0.002, 1.007) E
09H Train Handling (excl. Brakes) 134 Triangle(0.007, 0.007, 1.15) F
10T Turnout Defects - Switches 133 Triangle(0.008, 0.008, 1.091) F
13E Other Wheel Defects (Car) 119 Normal(0.500, 0.262) M
05M Other Miscellaneous 112 Beta (0.506, 0.662) FR
09E Sidebearing, Suspension Defects (Car) 108 Beta (1.137, 0.950) R
11H Use of Switches 97 Beta (0.518, 0.701) FR
01M Obstructions 93 Expo(0.280) F
EO All other Equipment Causes 505 Beta (0.730, 0.827) FR
HO All other Human Factor Causes 228 Beta (0.604, 0.761) FR
TO All other Track Causes 354 Beta (0.601, 0.902) FR
01S All Signal Failures 15 Beta (0.300, 0.400) FR
Cause groups in Table 3.3 are further re-grouped into three main cause groups in the last
column. Those causes that affect the front and front or rear-end of a train are categorized
as group (C1). The second group (C2) includes causes that have an impact on the rear-end
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of a train, and finally, the last group (C3) is kept for causes that influence the middle of a
train.
3.4.4 Factors Affecting Derailment Cause
Ideally, geometric attributes of rail corridors, such as minimum radius (meter), maximum
longitudinal gradient, and super elevation (millimeter), should be used as important mea-
sures for evaluating the dependency of cause on route attributes. However, because of lack
of available information, topographical features of the rail segment (area) have been used
instead. The Arc Map Version 9.2 package has been used to separate the rail network
in the US into two areas (levels): flat and mountain. The flat area, which covers mostly
the central and eastern parts of the country, has an elevation difference of less than 1500
meters, while the mountain area is defined as a region with an elevation difference higher
than that of the flat area.
The US Federal Railroad Administration classifies track for freight trains into nine
categories, based on various qualities and speed considerations (Table 3.1). However, in
this study, track class is categorized as either poor (1-4)(G1) or good (5-9)(G2)to ensure
sufficient data for the analysis.
In addition, train length is used as a source of rolling stock attributes (car information).
Following a previous study [15], train length has been categorized into three possibilities:
short (less than 40 cars), medium, and long (more than 120 cars).
3.4.5 Relating Train Derailment Causes to Route Attributes and
Rolling Stock Characteristics
The FRA data (1997-2006) can be summarized in a 4-way contingency table as below
(Table 3.4). Log-linear analysis has been conducted to uncover the relationship structure
among the factors: Cause groups, Train length, Area, and Track class. For simplicity, these
factors are labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively, in the analysis below. Note that the factors Track
class and Area are route attributes, while Train length is a rolling stock characteristic. It
should be noted that in Table 3.4, a very small number (1.00E-12) is used instead of zero
(sampling zero).
The Statistica software package provides as the platform for this analysis. The results
of fitting hierarchical loglinear models are reported in Table 3.5. The model showing only
the main effects is referred to by K-factor =1, and 2-way, 3-way, and 4-way interactions
models are referred to by K-factor=2,3,4 respectively. This table shows that the largest
but least-complex model that best fits the data is the one with all 2-way interactions
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Table 3.4: Contingency table based on cause, train length, area, and track class
Track Class Area Train Length Cause Group
Cause Group 1 Cause Group 2 Cause Group 3
Track Class G1
Flat
Short 325 116 4
Medium 488 193 23
Long 58 9 3
Mountain
Short 7 3 1.00E-12
Medium 18 9 2
Long 5 1 2
Track Class G2
Flat
Short 71 32 3
Medium 402 206 47
Long 80 28 18
Mountain
Short 7 2 1.00E-12
Medium 41 13 7
Long 5 2 2
(associations). It is worth noting that the null hypothesis in each row of Table 3.5 is that
all K-factor interactions are simultaneously zero.
Table 3.5: Results of fitting all K-factor interactions
K-factors df LR statistic P-value
1 6 4686.016 0
2 13 290.502 0
3 12 13.351 0.344
4 4 0.709 0.950
Table 3.6 reports the results of the partial and marginal analyses of individual effects.
In the partial association test of a specific effect for K-way association or interaction,
the model that includes all K-way interactions is compared with the one without that
specific effect. For example, effect 12 in Table 3.6 represents the association between
factors 1 (Cause) and 2 (Train Length). When this effect is removed from the model with
all 2-way associations, the value of the test statistic, which is the difference between the
log-likelihood values, is equal to 30.94, with 4 degrees of freedom. Examination of the
corresponding P-value, makes clear that the model fit becomes significantly worse when
this two-way interaction is excluded from the model.
In the marginal association test of a specific effect for K-way association, the model
without any K-way interactions is compared with the model that includes this specific
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effect. For example, when effect 12 in Table 3.6 is added to the model showing all main
effects (1-way interaction), the value of the test statistic that is the difference between
the log-likelihood values is equal to 45.85, with 4 degrees of freedom. The corresponding
P-value reveal the model fit becomes significantly better when this two-way interaction is
included in the model.
Table 3.6: Test of marginal and partial association
Effect df Statistic (partial) P-value (partial) Statistic (marginal) P-value (marginal)
1 2 1449.983 0 1449.983 0
2 2 1090.096 0 1090.096 0
3 1 2106.317 0 2106.317 0
4 1 39.620 0 39.620 0
12 4 30.946 0 45.851 0
13 2 6.284 0.043 10.185 0.006
14 2 21.464 0.00002 37.457 0
23 2 1.607 0.448 7.791 0.021
24 2 172.983 0 191.188 0
34 1 14.301 0.0001 21.502 0.000004
123 4 1.536 0.820 1.254 0.869
124 4 1.982 0.739 1.837 0.765
134 2 3.965 0.138 4.923 0.085
234 2 5.306 0.070 5.402 0.067
Choosing the effects for the model require a review of the “tests of partial and marginal
association” in Table 3.6. Several strategies exist for combining the results of these tests.
A factor is retained when both partial and marginal tests are in agreement; otherwise, it is
removed from the model [26]. Applying this strategy, all two-way interactions except the
23 association should be included in the model.
In summary, it is concluded that the log-linear model that fits the observed table (Table
3.4) is given by
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k l are 2-way interaction effects.
Note that it is necessary to impose some technical constraints on the effects in order to
estimate them. These constraints are not discussed here. The reader can consult with
Christensen [26] for more details on log-linear models. The p-value for testing the model
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given by Equation (3.7) versus the saturated model is 0.61569 with df = 18. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the specified model is sufficient to explain the frequencies in Table
3.4.
The model given by Equation (3.7) shows that, given factors 1 (cause) and 4 (track
class), factors 2 (train length) and 3 (area) are independent. In addition, it can be con-
cluded that the factor “cause” is associated with all three other factors.
Table 3.7 provides the estimates for λs in the log-linear Equation (3.7), which was in
the SPSS software package. The last two columns report 95% confidence intervals for the
parameters’ λs. It can be seen that all main effects (parameters) are significant, except for
level 2 of the factor “cause”. In addition, all 2-way associations are also significant at the
level 5% except λ1311 which refers to the combination of the front of a train and a flat area.
Looking at Table 3.7, and the sign of the estimates for λs, the data using Equation (3.7)
can be further investigated. Note that the positive and negative signs for the estimates in
Table 3.8 refer to positive and negative effects of the corresponding levels of the factors on
the probability of derailment in that factor level. Below are some of our findings:
• The model shows that cause group one, which affects the front of trains, is the main
reason for more derailments compared to other types of causes. Similar results have
been reported in a previous study [51].
• The highest number of derailments occur with trains of 40 -120 cars (medium), while
the lowest number occurs with short trains(less than 40) as expected.
• Track quality improvement from poor to high results in corresponding decrease in the
number of derailment. However, this issue has been justified in a previous study [19]
as follows: In the US, the right to use mainlines with good quality track is mainly
reserved for Class I railroads (with a high volume of traffic); Class II and III railroads
(with less traffic) are confined to lines of with lower quality track.
• Short trains are more prone to derailment than longer trains as a result of cause
groups 1 or 2.
– Derailments for short trains happen for cause group 1 (affect front) more than
for other types of causes, and fewer are expected for longer trains
– The derailment of short trains happen for cause group 2 (affect rear end) for
other causes, and fewer are expected for longer trains
• Trains in flat areas are more prone to be derailed compared to those in mountain
areas as a result of cause group 2.
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Table 3.7: Estimates of λ’s in Equation (3.7)
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Z Sig. 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Constatnt 1.026 0.33 3.115 0.002 0.381 1.672
(Cause=1) 0.932 0.358 2.604 0.009 0.231 1.634
(Cause=2) -0.413 0.406 -1.017 0.309 -1.209 0.383
(Cause=3) 0 . . . . .
(TL=1) -2.033 0.443 -4.584 0 -2.902 -1.164
(TL=2) 1.004 0.233 4.307 0 0.547 1.461
(TL=3) 0 . . . . .
(AREA=1) 1.816 0.299 6.073 0 1.23 2.402
(AREA=2) 0 . . . . .
(TRK=1) -2.133 0.304 -7.012 0 -2.729 -1.537
(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=1)-(TL=1) 1.897 0.449 4.228 0 1.018 2.777
(CAUSE=1)-(TL=2) 0.6 0.249 2.409 0.016 0.112 1.088
(CAUSE=1)-(TL=3) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=2)-(TL=1) 2.312 0.473 4.886 0 1.385 3.24
(CAUSE=2)-(TL=2) 0.117 0.258 3.922 0 0.559 1.675
(CAUSE=2)-(TL=3) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(TL=1) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(TL=2) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(TL=3) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=1)-(AREA=1) 0.625 0.321 1.946 0.052 -0.005 1.255
(CAUSE=1)-(AREA=2) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=2)-(AREA=1) 0.778 0.353 2.204 0.028 0.086 1.469
(CAUSE=2)-(AREA=2) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(AREA=1) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(AREA=2) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=1)-(TRK=1) 0.905 0.219 4.126 0 0.475 1.334
(CAUSE=1)-(TRK=2) 0 0 . . . .
(CAUSE=2)-(TRK=1) 0.65 0.229 2.841 0.004 0.202 1.099
(CAUSE=2)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(TRK=1) 0 . . . . .
(CAUSE=3)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(TL=1)-(TRK=1) 1.891 0.179 10.549 0 1.54 2.243
(TL=1)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(TL=2)-(TRK=1) 0.576 0.154 3.731 0 0.274 0.879
(TL=2)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(TL=3)-(TRK=1) 0 . . . . .
(TL=3)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(AREA=1)-(TRK=1) 0.843 0.194 4.347 0 0.463 1.224
(AREA=1)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
(AREA=2)-(TRK=1) 0 . . . . .
(AREA=2)-(TRK=2) 0 . . . . .
• Trains on poor quality track are derailed more than ones on good quality track for
either cause group 1 or 2.
• Short trains on poor track are derailed more than short trains on good track. This
finding is true for medium trains too
• As the quality of track in flat areas improves, the number of derailments decreases.
29
Table 3.8 is the conditional probability distribution of cause given different combinations
of “train length”, “area”, and “track classes”. These probabilities have been estimated
using the model given by Equation (3.7), and the estimates of λs reported in Table 3.8.


























The joint probability distribution of the factors “train length”, “area”, and “track class”
is now p. jkl = p1jkl + p2jkl + p3jkl, and, thus, the conditional probability of cause being at
level i given that the other factors are at levels train length = j, area = k, track class = l
is




Table 3.8: Estimated conditional probability distributions of derailment causes given the
factors “train length”, “area”, “track class”
(train length,area,track class) C1 C2 C3
(1,1,1) 0.730 0.260 0.009
(1,1,2) 0.670 0.310 0.021
(2,1,1) 0.694 0.274 0.032
(2,1,2) 0.615 0.313 0.071
(3,1,1) 0.757 0.178 0.064
(3,1,2) 0.660 0.200 0.139
(1,2,1) 0.752 0.229 0.018
(1,2,2) 0.688 0.271 0.041
(2,2,1) 0.701 0.237 0.061
(2,2,2) 0.605 0.264 0.131
(3,2,1) 0.735 0.148 0.117
(3,2,2) 0.604 0.157 0.238
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3.5 Point of Derailment Analyses and Modeling
A rail car can be involved in a derailment either by initiating a derailment or by being
derailed itself due to the derailment of the cars in front of it [42].Thus, in estimating the
probability of derailment by position along a train, two factors need to be considered: the
point at which the train derailment begins (POD) and the number of cars derailing after











































































Figure 3.2: Frequency of derailment by position (Source:[12])
Figure 3.2 illustrates the frequency of derailment by position for a standard 100-car
train, based on historical derailment data from the US for the period 1992-2001. This
figure clearly shows a strong relationship between position and derailment. For instance,
under the same conditions and for the same train, a car in position 11 is more likely to
derail than a car in position 80.
This section provides a detailed discussion of the point of derailment (POD), and the
number of cars derailing is discussed in the next section.
Previous work by El-Hage [30] suggests a link between the causes of derailment and
the position of the train where the derailment begins (POD). He took train length into
account for estimating the POD by normalizing the length in the range 1 to 100 cars; then
he generated probability tables and histograms of the normalized points of derailment
for the different derailment causes. For instance, derailments caused by road bed defects
occurred in the front sections of trains rather than in other sections. Anderson and Barkan
[12] modeled normalized POD probabilities by regression of data using beta distribution
with parameters α and β. They considered all accident causes simultaneously. Figure 3.3










































Figure 3.3: Likelihood of points of derailment (Source: [12])
The link between train derailment and POD requires further specification of the primary
cause of each train derailment. The underlying assumption is that different causes are
likely to lead to different POD profiles. For example, it is expected that the front of a train
would be more likely to derail if a track-related problem causes the derailment, since it is
the front of a train that first encounters any track faults as the train traverses a segment.
Rolling stock defects, on the other hand, can take place at different points. A previous
study [53] used ANOVA to confirm the relationship between cause and POD empirically by
analyzing derailment data from Canada (years 1983-1985). Another study [51] presented
a methodology to estimate the probability of POD for different causes and train lengths.
The first step in estimating POD for each track segment is obtaining the probability of
different derailment causes along each route segment, as has been discussed in the previous
section. In addition, the previous section shows that the probability of derailment causes
is a function of route attributes and rolling stock characteristics.
3.5.1 Factors Affecting POD
This section explores several factors that explain POD, based on historical train derailments
reported by the FRA for the period 1997-2006. As illustrated in Figure 3.4, out of 4148
derailments in this database (after data cleaning), over 18% were found to take place at
the front of trains, and only 3% were found to take place beyond the 100th car position.
One of the major problems with using these observations to establish POD rates is that
they do not take train-length distribution into account. The distribution of train lengths
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Figure 3.4: POD distribution from FRA database 1997-2006 (Source:[9])
in the FRA database is shown in Figure 3.5, and indicates that over 30% of trains are in
the 0-50 car-length range. Hence, there appears to be an over-representation of front-end
positions in the distribution, which leads to an over-representation of front-of-train POD
in the database.
Figure 3.5: Train length distribution from FRA database 1997-2006(Source:[9])
To adjust for train length, a number of studies [30, 51] have expressed POD in a nor-
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malized form (NPOD) that reflects a standard 100-car train. While the NPOD accounts
for absolute train length, it fails to reflect dynamic forces acting on the train with respect
to POD that cause car-track instability leading to derailments. This failure requires spec-
ification of actual positions along a train in lieu of standardized measures. For example
the 50th percentile position in a 10-car train is subjected to different dynamic forces along
a sharp curve than those for the 50th percentile position in a 100-car train.
To account for limitations in NPOD, FRA train derailments in this study have been
classified into short (< 40 cars), medium (40 to 120 cars), and long (> 120 cars) trains, and
analyzed separately with respect to their NPOD. The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test,
a one-way analysis of variance by ranks, was applied to determine whether train length
(short, medium, and long) provides a statistically significant explanation for median POD.
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Kruskal-Wallis test for comparing NPOD in 3 different train length groups




Using the Minitab 14.0 software package, the Kruskal-Wallis test examines the validity
of the null hypothesis that the median NPOD does not differ according to train length,
against its alternative assertion that median NPOD differs for at least two out of the three
train length groups. The sample NPOD medians for the three groups were estimated to
be 0.33 for short trains, 0.57 for medium trains, and 0.47 for long trains. The Kruskal-
Wallis test yielded a test statistic value of 239.5 well above its critical value of χ20.05,2 = 5.99.
Hence, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis Ho that there is no difference
in NPOD medians for different groupins of train length. It can also be stated that the
absolute train length has a significant effect on POD. The next factor possibly affecting
POD is derailment cause. Using Canadian derailment data for the period 1983-1985, [30]
established a statistical expression linking POD to five primary causes: roadbed defect,
track geometry, railbar, switches, and general car. Using more recent US-FRA derailment
data, [51] also found that derailments are more likely to begin at the front of a train when
the primary cause is track-related, and the middle of the train when the cause is rolling
stock-related.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of NPOD for the FRA database for the period
1997- 2006. These distributions are controlled for three underlying and mutually-exclusive
causes of derailment: rail, joint bar, and rail anchoring defects; track geometry and brake
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failures. In this figure, train position was aggregated into quartiles to ensure that sufficient
observations were obtained from the data for each train length category. For “rail, joint
bar, and rail anchoring”, over 35% of all derailments were found to take place at the front
of the train (first quarter), while for derailments caused by “brake failures”, the highest
frequency NPOD intervals were observed in the middle. For “track geometry,” the highest
frequency intervals occurred in the rear section of the train.
Figure 3.6: Comparison of point of derailment probability for different causes
Table 3.10 summarizes the results of Kruskal-Wallis testing comparing median NPOD
to cause of derailment for the FRA (1997-2006) data. The sample medians for the three
cause groups in Table 3.10 were estimated to be 0.40, 0.64, and 0.50, respectively. The
value of the test statistic, 130.27, exceeded its critical value of χ20.05, 2 = 5.99 at the 5%
level of significance. Hence, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis Ho (no
cause effect) and conclude that the causes have a statistically significant effect on POD
when trains are adjusted for length. The above test provides some statistical evidence that
the probability of POD along a given route segment depends on train length and primary
cause of derailment.
3.5.2 Method for Estimating POD
The primary aim of this section is to develop expressions for estimating POD probability
for different derailment causes and train lengths. A number of distributions were explored
to explain NPOD by train length and cause (C). The best-fit distribution for each of the
nine groupings of train length (short, medium, and long) and derailment cause (C1: track,
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Table 3.10: Kruskal-Wallis test for comparing NPOD in 3 different cause groups
Cause Number of records Median
Track related (excluding track geometry) 1573 0.397
Track geometry 831 0.639
Car related 1799 0.504
roadbed, and structure, excluding track geometry, C2: track-geometry related and C3:
causes related to each car (such as mechanical and electrical causes ) was established for
the FRA data using BestFit software developed by Palisade [1]. FRA derailment data by
position was initially classified into three train length groups (short, medium and long) and
subsequently into three causes. An example of the distribution for track-related causes for
medium length trains is illustrated in Figure 3.7. Four different types of distribution (beta,
triangle, uniform, and exponential) have been fitted to POD frequency for medium train
length and track-related causes.
Figure 3.7: Four distributions for track related derailments involving medium trains
Comparison of observed POD frequency from the FRA data with expected values from
the underlying distribution provided χ2 statistic. Table 3.11 summarizes these Chi-Square
values of the four distributions considered. For this combination of derailment cause and
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train length, the Beta distribution yielded the lowest Chi-Square value and, hence, the
best-fit result.
In a similar fashion, best-fit distributions were obtained for all nine train length/cause
combinations or groupings (Table 3.12).
Table 3.11: Values of the χ2 goodness of fit statistic of distributions for track-related






Table 3.12: Best fit POD distributions (U=Uniform, T=Triangle, Beta=General Beta) for
all derailment causes and train lengths
Short train Medium train Long train
Cause Group 1 U(0.03,1) Beta(0.575,0.6579) Beta(0.602,0.745)
Cause Group 2 T(-0.094,1, 1) Beta(0.782,0.504) Beta(0.646,0.59)
Cause Group 3 U(0.031,1.005) U(0.008,1) Beta(0.763,0.799)
To illustrate how these results can be used, we consider the probability of derailment
for the 10th position of a 39-car train (at the top of the short train class). The best-fit
distribution for track-related causes is U(0.03, 1), and this finding yields a probability of
0.10 for the 10th position for a short-train membership. On the other hand, for the same
10th position and cause on a 41 car train, a Beta(0.58, 0.66) distribution is used for a
medium-train length membership. This distribution yields a probability of 0.09 for the
same 10th-car position. The difference between these estimates can be explained by the
uncertainty associated with assigned train length membership of between 39 and 41 cars
(i.e., short versus medium).
To incorporate this uncertainty, it is considered a membership expression [58] of the
form
Pr(POD at position j) =




where f1(j) and f2(j) are estimated from probabilities of NPOD from Table 3.12 for a
given position j, train length, and cause group. The membership values m1 and m2 are
obtained for a given train length e, from Figure 3.8.
As shown in Figure 3.8, assuming a 41-car train over a segment of track subject to
cause group 2 (track-geometry related), it is obtained a membership factor of m1 = 0.68
for a short-train classification and m2 = 0.32 for a medium-train classification. Since a
41-car train is considerably shorter than the 80-car minimum for long train classification,
the membership function associated with long trains is assumed to be zero.
Figure 3.8: Membership function for different classes of train length
The probability of derailment for the 10th position (in a train with 41 cars) with a
cause-2 derailment (track- geometry related) is obtained by applying the following four
steps:
i. For the 41-car train, Figure 3.8 suggests the membership factors m1 = 0.68 and
m2 = 0.32 for short and medium trains, respectively.
ii. The ratio of NPOD is calculated as 10/41 = 0.244.
iii. From Table 3.12, the corresponding derailment probabilities are obtianed: f1 = 0.033
and f2 = 0.07.
Assuming a short train membership, f1 is established from the Triangle distribution
from Table 3.12, T (−0.094, 1, 1). The resultant derailment probability for position
10 on this 41 car train is estimated to be 0.0133.
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Assuming a medium train membership, f2 is established from the Beta distribu-
tion, Beta(0.782, 0.504), the derailment probability for position 10 becomes 0.0165,
a difference of about 20%.
iv. The probability of initiating a derailment per position is obtained by combining the
fuzzy function memberships with the underlying NPOD distribution values as per
the above membership expression, such that
Pr(POD at position 10) =
f1(10) · m1(e) + f2(10) · m2(e)
m1(e) +m2(e)
= 0.014.
In a similar fashion, the probabilities for each position on the 41-car train can be obtained,
with the results given in Table 3.13 for track geometry-related derailments. A similar set
of values can be obtained for the other cause groups for the 41-car train.
As discussed previously (Equation (3.4)), the probability of POD along a given route
segment also depends on the cause of derailment. Thus, the probability of point of derail-
ment can be expressed as




Pr(POD at position j |Cause g)× Pr(Cause g)
]
.
using Causes 1, 2, and 3 introduced in Section 3.4. Note that Pr(Cause g) is obtained from
Table 3.8. For the above example, to calculate the probability of derailing for the 10th
position (in a train with 41 cars) with a cause-2 derailment (track geometry related), it is
assumed that Pr(Cause 2) = 1 while Pr(Cause 1) = 0 and Pr(Cause 3) = 0. However, for
the case study (Chapter 5), this assumption is not be followed.
3.6 Analysis of Number of Cars Derailed
A.D. Little Inc. [41] has suggested a non-linear relationship between the mean number of
cars derailing and train speed (in mph), such that
Mnd = 1.7 (Speed)
0.5 , . (3.9)
where Mnd is the mean number of cars derailing and the train speed is in miles per hour.
A number of studies [52, 12] have suggested that the number of cars derailing is also
affected by residual train length and cause of derailment. The longer the residual length
of the train (post POD), the higher the potential number of cars derailing. The link
between cars derailing and train length is affected by the cause of derailment, such that,
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Table 3.13: POD probability for a 41 car train (m1=0.68, m2=0.32)
POS j NPOD f1(j) f2(j) Pr(POD at position j)
1 0.0244 0.0043 0.0304 0.0127
2 0.0488 0.0053 0.0222 0.0107
3 0.0732 0.0063 0.0200 0.0107
4 0.0976 0.0073 0.0188 0.0110
5 0.1220 0.0083 0.0181 0.0114
6 0.1463 0.0093 0.0175 0.0119
7 0.1707 0.0103 0.0171 0.0125
8 0.1951 0.0113 0.0169 0.0131
9 0.2195 0.0123 0.0167 0.0137
10 0.2439 0.0133 0.0165 0.0143
11 0.2683 0.0143 0.0164 0.0150
12 0.2927 0.0153 0.0164 0.0156
13 0.3171 0.0163 0.0163 0.0163
14 0.3415 0.0173 0.0164 0.0170
15 0.3659 0.0182 0.0164 0.0177
16 0.3902 0.0192 0.0165 0.0184
17 0.4146 0.0202 0.0166 0.0191
18 0.4390 0.0212 0.0167 0.0198
19 0.4634 0.0222 0.0169 0.0205
20 0.4878 0.0232 0.0171 0.0212
21 0.5122 0.0242 0.0173 0.0220
22 0.5366 0.0252 0.0175 0.0227
23 0.5610 0.0262 0.0178 0.0235
24 0.5854 0.0272 0.0181 0.0243
25 0.6098 0.0282 0.0185 0.0251
26 0.6341 0.0292 0.0189 0.0259
27 0.6585 0.0302 0.0194 0.0267
28 0.6829 0.0312 0.0199 0.0276
29 0.7073 0.0322 0.0205 0.0284
30 0.7317 0.0332 0.0213 0.0293
31 0.7561 0.0342 0.0221 0.0303
32 0.7805 0.0351 0.0230 0.0313
33 0.8049 0.0361 0.0242 0.0323
34 0.8293 0.0371 0.0256 0.0334
35 0.8537 0.0381 0.0273 0.0347
36 0.8780 0.0391 0.0295 0.0360
37 0.9024 0.0401 0.0324 0.0376
38 0.9268 0.0411 0.0365 0.0396
39 0.9512 0.0421 0.0430 0.0424
40 0.9756 0.0431 0.0555 0.0471
41 1 0.0441 0.1320 0.0722
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for example, causes that have a more pronounced effect on lateral instability result in more
cars jumping the track following the initial derailment.
Using data reported by the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) for the period
1983 to 1985, [52] explored the relationship between the probability of a specific number
of cars derailing and the residual train length (Lr), speed and cause of derailment. For a
train length L, and position j, they introduced a truncated geometric distribution for the
probability of k cars derailing, such that:




if k = 1, . . . , Lr
0 otherwise
(3.10)
where, Lr = L− j+1 is the residual length or simply number of cars after POD, and 1−p
is the probability of derailment for a position after POD. The probability p, is assumed to





where z is a linear function of speed, Lr, and causes. As a standard approach for categorical
variables, considering the cause “railbar” as a baseline, the other causes are entered to
this model as binary variables (i.e., 0 or 1 for absence or presence of a specific cause,
respectively). Thus for a typical train we have
z = βo + β1 (speed) + β2 Lr + β3 (roadbed) + · · ·+ β8 (all other) .
The results from fitting a logit expression to derailment data from the CTC are summa-
rized in Table 3.14. With the exception of switching causes, all factors have a statistically
significant effect in explaining mean number of cars derailed.
Similar to the previous study, in this research, the distribution in Equation (3.10) is
linked to the covariates through the logit function. This truncated geometric logistic model
is fitted to the FRA data (instead of the CTC data) for the period of 1997-2006. Parameter
values were estimated by maximizing a likelihood function of the form






using statistical software R (http://cran.r-project.org/). The results of this calibra-
tion are summarized in Table 3.15. The calibration procedure is presented in Appendix
C.
With the possible exception of residual train length and track geometry, all input factors
were found to provide a significant explanation for mean number of cars derailing at the
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Table 3.14: Summary statistics for POD logit expression from CTC derailment data
Student Lower Upper
Parameters Estimates Std.Error T-test (95% interval) (95% interval)
Intercept 1.674 0.334 5.01 1.017 2.331
Residual length -0.638 0.053 11.855 -0.744 -0.532
Speed effect -0.575 0.082 7.036 -0.736 -0.414
Roadbed 0.648 0.143 4.505 0.365 0.931
Track geometry 0.382 0.094 4.060 1.197 0.577
Railbar NA
Switches 0.470 1.425 0.330 -2.33 3.270
General car 1.672 0.323 5.181 1.308 2.306
Axles/wheels 1.510 0.128 11.771 1.258 1.763
All other 1.329 0.261 5.091 0.816 1.842
Table 3.15: Summary statistics for estimates for FRA database (1997-2006)
Z Lower Upper
Parameters Estimates Std.Error statistics (95% interval) (95% interval)
Intercept -2.013 0.082 -24.465 -1.850 -2.170
Residual length 0.001 0.001 1.266 0.002 -0.001
Speed effect -0.032 0.002 -17.075 -0.029 -0.036
Roadbed 0.419 0.018 2.367 0.766 0.072
Track geometry 0.171 0.089 1.921 0.346 -0.003
Railbar NA
Switches 0.715 0.119 6.013 0.949 0.482
General car 0.841 0.085 10.132 1.030 0.697
Axles/wheels 1.108 0.077 14.404 1.260 0.958
All other 0.444 0.073 6.056 0.587 0.300
5% level. Track geometry and residual train length were found to be significant at the 10%
level. Table 3.15 also gives the 95% confidence interval for each of the factors considered.
Note that since the cause railbar is considered as a baseline, there is no parameter associated
with in above tables. This table also shows that increasing the train speed would reduce
the z value and subsequently increase the derailment probability. In addition, the effect




Rail Yard Marshalling Model
According to the framework presented in Figure 2.1, the rail yard marshalling model (as-
sembly model) is the second component of this study which describes the practical opera-
tions restrictions to the proposed model.
This research problem has been stated as an optimization problem. The Chapter 3
discussed how to obtain the components of the objective function. The missing part of
the optimization model is its constraints which address realistic operating conditions. This
chapter introduces the three constraints including DG marshalling violations (crew safety,
and incompatibility) and yard operation cost (time). The final mathematical formulation
and solution methods are then presented.
It should be noted that since 1980, many studies have been conducted about rail yard
operations; however, these models mainly focus on minimizing overall rail yard operation
time through hump sequence [61], blocking plan [20, 10] and train scheduling [37]. Previous
works have failed to suggest any model for the yard engine operation in the classification
yard. The algorithm in Appendix E has been developed to model the yard engine operation
in case of presence of a DG car in a block.
4.1 DG Marshalling Regulatory Constraints
Both Canada and the US have specific regulations for the marshalling of DG cars. These
regulations serve two basic purposes: to keep DG separate from personnel and to keep
incompatible DG materials separate from each other[22, 50]. For example, most regulations
prevent locating any DG car next to an operating engine, occupied rail vehicle, and caboose
to increase the safety of rail personnel. In addition, it is prohibited to assign a DG car to
next to a car with a source of ignition or next to a flatcar with protruding lading, to reduce
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the likelihood of DG material being released. Furthermore, DG cars must be separated by
at least one car.
Canadian Transport Dangerous Goods (TDG) classifies DG into nine classes :
Class 1 (1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4) explosives
Class 2 (2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) gases (flammable, toxic and oxidizing)
Class 3 flammable liquids
Class 4 (4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) flammable solids (liable to spontaneous combustion and wa-
ter reactive subtances)
Class 5 (5.1 and 5.2) oxidizing substances and organic peroxides
Class 6 (6.1 and 6.2) poisonous (toxic) and infectious substances
Class 7 radioactive materials
Class 8 corrosives
Class 9 miscellaneous products or substances
In addition, each DG has a unique number (UN number) that must be displayed on a car
placard (More details are provided in Appendix D).
Following the 1979 Mississauga train derailment, the Canadian Transport Commission
(CTC) regulated the marshaling of DG cars. The main intent of the CTC regulations is to
provide sufficient distance to separate train personnel from DG cars. Table 4.1 summarizes
the current regulations concerned with the placement of DG cars along a train consist.
Based on these regulations, it is prohibited that DG cars described in column 1 be placed
next to cars described in column 2.
U.S. regulations on DG car positions are similar to Canadian regulations, as shown in
Table 4.2. Nine DG classes reclassified into four placard groups and the cars that carry
specific groups are not allowed to be located next to each other. For instance, Placard
Group 1, which includes explosive materials, can not be adjacent to Placard Group 2,
which includes compressed gas.
The number of buffers between the crew and first DG car is not the same in the US and
Canada. Recently, US Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration reviewed the importance of buffer size [56]. This review states
interestingly, in Canada, there is not any report shows a major incident as the result of






Any class of dangerous goods  (a) an operating engine or an engine tender unless 
all the railway vehicles in the train, other than 
engines, tenders and cabooses, have placards 
displayed on them; 
(b) an occupied railway vehicle unless all the other 
railway vehicles in the train, other than engines, 
tenders and cabooses, are occupied or have 
placards displayed on them; 
(c) a railway vehicle that has a continual source of 
ignition; or 
(d) a railway vehicle that is a flat car from which 
part of the lading protrudes. 
Dangerous goods included in Class 1.1 or 
Class 1.2 
Any railway vehicle that is required to have a 
placard displayed on it for Class 2, 3, 4 or 5. 
UN1008, BORON TRIFLUORIDE 
COMPRESSED
UN1026, CYANOGEN 
UN1051, HYDROGEN CYANIDE, 
STABILIZED 
UN1067, DINITROGEN TETROXIDE or 
NITROGEN DIOXIDE 
UN1076, PHOSGENE 
UN1589, CYANOGEN CHLORIDE, 
STABILIZED 
UN1614, HYDROGEN CYANIDE, 
STABILIZED 
Any railway vehicle that is required to have a 
placard displayed on it for Class 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, 
unless the railway vehicle next to it contains the 
same dangerous goods. 
UN1660, NITRIC OXIDE, COMPRESSED 
UN1911, DIBORANE, COMPRESSED 
UN1975, NITRIC OXIDE AND 
DINITROGEN TETROXIDE MIXTURE or 




UN2204, CARBONYL SULPHIDE or 
CARBONYL SULFIDE 
UN3294, HYDROGEN CYANIDE, 
SOLUTION IN ALCOHOL 
Any railway vehicle that is required to have a 
placard displayed on it for Class 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, 
unless the railway vehicle next to it contains the 
same dangerous goods. 




















1-When train permits, placarded car may not be nearer 
than the sixth car from the engine or occupied caboose.  
2-When train length does not permit, placarded car must 
be placed near the middle of the train, but not nearer than 
the second car from an engine or occupied caboose. 
3-A placarded car may not be placed next to an open-top 
car when any of the lading in the open top car protrudes 
beyond the car ends, or if the lading shifted, would 
protrude beyond the car ends. 
4-A placarded car may not be placed next to a loaded flat 
car, except closed TOFC/COFC equipment, auto carriers, 
and other especially equipped cars with tie-down devices 
for securing vehicles. Permanent bulk head flat cars are 
considered the same as open-top cars. 
5-A placarded car may not be placed next to any 
transport vehicle or freight container having an internal 
combustion engine or an open-flame device in operation. 
6- Placarded cars may not be placed next to each other 
based on the following: 
                Placard Group 1………………………………     
                Placard Group 2……………………………… 
                Placard Group 3……………………………… 



































Group1-Divisions 1.1 and 1.2 (explosive) materials. 
Group2 - Divisions 1. 3, 1. 4, 1. 5 (explosives). Class 2 (compressed gas: other than Div 2. 3, PG I, Zone 
A). Class (flammable liquid), Class 4 (flammable solid), Class 5 (oxidizing). Class 6 (poisonous liquid; 
other than Div 6.1, PG I, Zone A), and Class 8 (corrosive) materials. 
Group3 – Divisions 2. 3 (Zone A: poisonous gas) and 6.1 (PG I, Zone A; poisonous liquid) materials. 
Group 4 – Class 7 (radioactive) materials. 
Figure 4.2: Regulations of placarded cars in the US (Source: [50])
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While the regulation provides overall guidelines, they do not address the problem of
optimally positioning DG cars in terms of their potential for derailment and operating
costs.
This section shows how the model accommodates DG marshalling violations in train
assembly. Canadian Pacific Railway General Operating Instructions (GOI) [49] summarize
the regulations for DG marshalling so that DG are adequately separated from
• occupied equipment, such as an operating locomotive;
• other incompatible DG cars on the train;
• a car equipped with a source of ignition, a mechanical heating source, or cooling
device;
• an open top car with lading protrudes beyond the car or lading above the car end
that is liable to shift lengthwise;
• a loaded flat car.
The above five restrictions are included in the proposed model as follows: five cars for
the US, one car for Canada acts as buffers at the front of each block; incompatible DG
cars must be kept separate from one another, and the last three restrictions ( related to
source of ignition, open top car and loaded flat car) are combined to the incompatibility
constraint.
This section introduces the above restrictions as new constraints in the optimization
model. It should be noted that the marshalling restrictions apply to all DG cars, whether
they are loaded or contain only the residue of their DG load (residues).
Table 4.3 shows the incompatibility restriction for DG cars in the train consist. The
nine classes of DG materials are categorized into four groups (A, B, C, and D). For instance,
based on the regulations, it is prohibited for group A DG cars to be placed next to cars of
group B and C. There should be at least one buffer (non-DG) car between incompatible DG
cars (Notes 1 and 2 discussed in Table 4.3 are not considered for simplicity). The last three
restrictions grouped into a hypothetical group-Group E, which includes a car equipped with
a source of ignition, a mechanical heating source or cooling device; an open top car from
which lading protrudes beyond the car or lading rising above the car end is liable to shift
lengthwise; and a loaded flat car. Group F (hypothetical group) accommodates cars with
non-DG material.
The alternative combination of cars (X) is defined as
X =
{
x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn
}
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Figure 4.3: Incompatibility restrictions among DG cars (Source:[49])
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where, xi is ID of the car assigned to position i and n is the total number of poitions in
the train consist.
For any given combination of cars, the types of materials, either DG or non-DG are
inputs to the model. Thus for any initial combination of cars the types of loaded material












1, . . . , n
}
where h(xi) is the type of car xi, n is the total number of positions in the train consist,
and w represents the number of types of loaded materials. The first restriction (1) can be
introduced as a constraint in the model so:
h(xi) = 6, for i = 1, . . . , m (4.1)
where m, is the minimum size of buffers (m < n), determined by the regulation; for
instance, in the US, m equals to five cars while in Canada it is only one car.












1, . . . , w
}
where adf = 1 when the car involving DG material d must not be assigend next to a car
with DG material f or aij = 0 otherwise. Each cell in the matrix shows the interaction
of two types of materials. For the case w = 6, a13 = 1 since, based on Table 4.3, a car
with full of TNT (Group A or h=1) must not be located next to a car loaded with chlorine
(Group C or h=3).
π =

0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

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For a given train, the incompatibility restriction and remaining restrictions can be
shown as in the following constraint:
πxi,xi+1 = 0, i ∈
{
1, . . . , n− 1
}
(4.2)
4.2 Yard Operations Cost Constraint
Yard operation cost is one of the main factors influencing marshalling. A marshalling
solution that minimizes risk could mean additional costs because rail crews have to cut
off and couple cars to set a safer train consist. This study hence investigates the costs
associated with additional tasks to change the order of cars within blocks at a rail yard.
Currently, the order of blocks on a given train is generally set based on the sequence of
intermediate destination points along a route such that the block assigned to the closest
destination is shunted to the front of the train, followed by the block assigned to the next
closest destination, etc., until the final destination block is connected. Positioning the
blocks according to railway station sequence reduces the time for setting off procedures at
intermediate destinations. However, in some circumstances, this style of block positioning
is not followed. For instance, sometimes the order of blocks is changed because of loading
or unloading restrictions.
In June 2005, the US Federal Railroad Administration released a report that reviewed
several previous studies on the safe placement of train cars [8]. Because of the costs
associated with the additional switching of cars, the report rejected a suggestion made
by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Authorization Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-311) for
regulatory changes to increase the safe shipment of DG cars. Cars switching at rail yards
does increase the time of operation and thus means higher immediate cost. However,
this is a very short-sighted view of the situation, one that completely neglects the huge
environmental, safety, and financial costs of derailments involving the transport of DG
goods.
There are two options for taking into account the cost of yard operations: option 1,
adding a cost constraint to the optimization model; or option 2 incorporating the incre-
mental time required for marshalling into the objective function.
In this study, rail yard operation costs are considered as an additional constraint in the
model (option 1). The rail yard marshalling constraint considers that the rail yard train
assembly costs (or processing time) for each train and DG placement strategy should be
less than the threshold time (yard master’s decision). In this study, it is assumed that the
additional time required at intermediate destinations can be ignored for simplification.
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Two cost constraints are required: one for cutting off and marshaling cars and a second
for changing the order of blocks, which may increase the cost of cutting off the blocks during
the trip. The second option considers the incremental time required for marshalling. In this
case, once a train consist is determined, the cost associated with achieving it is reviewed
to balance safety and cost. By considering the cost of additional marshalling, a mutually
agreeable point can be found to show the most cost-effective yet safe strategy for a given
scenario.
Figure 4.4 illustrates an example of a given combination (X0) of cars in a block. It is
assumed that there is no difference between the X0 combination and the alternative one
(X) from position 1 to position i; thus, the first part of the train (between 1 to i) is ignored
in this analysis. For the second part of the train (between i to j), there is at least one
difference between the (X0) and (X) in that car y should replace car x in the i position.
x … y …k z…h
i … j …i-1 n1 …
X0 combination 
y … w …k t…h
i … j …i-1 n1 …
X combination  
Figure 4.4: General representation for a given and alternative combination of cars for one
block in a classification track
The proposed model begins once blocks have been formed with the desired number of
cars but before the blocks are shunted by a yard engine to the departure track. According
to information collected during interviews and site visits, the total time required for one
position change for a car within a block (tf ) can be assigned to the time required for
switching (tsw) and the time for additional marshalling (tm). In addition, the total time
(T ) required to complete all the changes (F ) is as follows:







The total time (T ) to change from the X0 to the X order of cars is the summation
of the time for each individual replacement, which should be less than the threshold time
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(TMax) determined by the yard master.
T (X0, X) ≤ TMax (4.3)
The following procedure details the operational steps involved in moving car y in posi-
tion j to the designed position i where x is located (Figure 4.5):
i. tie yard engine to car z and set off the train consist from position i
ii. move the cars (n− i+ 1) to the side
iii. back the cars(n− i+ 1) to the empty track
iv. set off the cars from position j, and move the cars ( n− j + 1) to the side
v. back the cars (n− j + 1) to the track 1, and couple the cars to car k
vi. move the rest of the cars (i− 1) from track 2 to the side and back to track 1
The total time for one replacement includes the time for four switching operations and
four trips of (n− i+ 1) cars back and forth.
The time for additional switching is a product of the number of times switching takes
place (c) and the fixed time required to switch from one line to another (t0 minute). The
total number of switches required to change the order of cars from a given combination to
an alternative one is the summation of all individual switches to change one position in a
given combination to an alternative.
tsw = c× t0
Figure 4.5 shows one way to change one car position assuming that one empty track is
available in the classification track.
The time for additional marshaling can be obtained based on the number of cars mar-
shaled from one track to another to reach the alternative combination. To estimate this
time, the rule of time = distance/velocity is used, where, the distance (mile) is the product




where v is the average speed of the yard engine in the classification yard used for marshalling
cars. v is usually in the range of 7 mph (11 km/h).
To achieve the alternative combination, the algorithm in Appendix E has been devel-





















x … g yk ……h





Figure 4.5: Changing one car position when one empty track is available
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4.3 Minimizing Derailment Risk Subject to Rail Yard
Constraint
As discussed before, for a given route segment and an n car train, the risk associated with















Finally, combining all the above equations ((3.5),(4.1),(4.2),(4.3)) results in the follow-
















1. h(xi) = 6, i = 1, . . . , m
2. πxi,xi+1 = 0, i ∈
{
1, . . . , n
}
3. T (X0, X) ≤ TMax




and xi is ID of the car assigned
to position i.
4.4 Solution Methods
This problem formulated previously is an integer programming (IP) problem, which is
fundamentally difficult to solve for large sized problems. For instance, consider a train
with 100 cars and half of them carrying DG materials. Assuming the train has only one
destination and all the DG have the same level of risk, the number of possible combinations
is more than 1029.
In this research, two solution approaches are considered: (1) enumeration; (2) Genetic
Algorithm (GA). The first approach is only viable for solving small sized problems and
therefore the second approach is selected to solve the research problem.
The Genetic Algorithm approach can find near optimal solutions to problems that are
“unsolvable” for standard linear and non-linear optimizers. A solution delivered from a
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genetic algorithm is called a “chromosome”, which is illustrated as a string including a set
of components called “genes”. In this study, a block of cars can be defined as a chromosome
and each car can be defined as a gene. Each chromosome is evaluated against an objective
function. The best chromosomes produce offspring chromosomes. Each time, the offspring
chromosome is evaluated and if it provides better results it replaces weaker members. This
process continues for a number of generations to obtain a near optimum solution [31]. This
research uses existing software called Evolver Palisade which provides powerful genetic
algorithm-based optimization techniques to solve the formulated optimization problems.
To implement the proposed model several software packages have been used (Figure
4.6). The in-transit risk model was encoded in Matlab (Appendix F) while the optimization
model has been implemented in Evolver (Palisade). The three restrictions have been added
as the constraints to Evolver. To calculate the time required for additional marshaling
operation in classification track, the algorithm (Appendix E) is coded in Visual Basic
(Appendix G). In Evolver, Visual Basic macros can be run at different times during an
optimization for each trial solution. This allows the development of custom calculations
that will be invoked during an optimization. This feature allows calculations which only
can be performed through the use of a macro to be made during an optimization. The
developed macro runs after recalculation of each trial that is executed (After Recalculation
of Each Trial ).
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Input Data
Train Derailment Analysis 
Point of Derailment Modeling 
Analysis of Number of Car Derailed 
Risk Value for Different Combinations 
Time of Additional Operation 
Best Combination of Cars & Blocks  














The merits of a new car placements model lie in its ability to achieve maximum risk
reduction at a minimum cost. The proposed model must be able to provide insights about
changes in overall risk for the optimal scenario compared to the current operation scenario.
For instance, how much of the risk of DG car derailment will be decreased if the order of
cars and blocks are changed based on the result of proposed model? What would be the
processing cost (time) for these changes? Are the results sensitive to changes in operation
conditions such as the proportion of DG?
In this chapter, the proposed risk-based model is applied to a rail corridor to demon-
strate how overall derailment risks can be effectively reduced through the marshaling of
DG along a train.
In addition, solutions from the proposed model are compared with results from other
suggested strategies. A sensitivity analysis has been carried out to determine how changes
in the proportion of DG, buffer size, and route attributes affect the model.
5.1 Description of Corridor and Shipment Character-
istics
The model is applied to a railway corridor (Figure 5.1) to illustrate how risks along a
route can be used to develop cost effective DG placement strategies at the rail yard. The
corridor connects Barstow (train origin point), California to Chicago (Corwith Station),
Illinois through two intermediate stations (Albuquerque and Kansas City) over 2100 miles
and involves a range of track geometry features for six segments. The Albuquerque, Kansas
City, and Corwith stations are situated respectively, at a distance of 768, 1663, and 2100
miles from the Barstow Hump Yard.
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Figure 5.1: The route map with six segments (Source:[6])
There are two main reasons for using this corridor. First, according to the US Com-
modity Flow Survey (CFS) in 2002 and Freight Analysis Framework (FAF), California and
Illinois are DG shipment origin and destination by rail, respectively [3, 4]. Second, the
corridor includes several segments with various geometric characteristics, including track
class and elevation differences (Table 5.1). The corridor is one of the few mainlines with
high-quality track (track class 5). Thus, a train along the corridor experiences poor and
high quality track from California to Illinois. In addition, the train traverses several areas
with different elevation differences.
Table 5.1: Corridor attributes
Station Seg. Distance Track Track Type Max Speed Elevation Topology
(mile) Class Poor (1) (mph) Difference (m) Flat (1)
Good (2) Mount.(2)
Albuquerque
1 169 4 1 60 4,507(CA) 2
2 599 5 2 80 3,830 (AZ) 2
Kansas City
3 243 4 1 60 3,147(NM) 2
4 157 5 2 80 3,391(CO) 2
5 495 5 2 80 1,024 (KS) 1
Corwith 6 437 5 2 80 470 (MO), 291(IL) 1
To understand the track class of each segment, the timetable speeds of passenger train
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has been used. The Southwest Chief passenger train operates along 2260 miles to connect
Los Angles, California to Chicago, Illinois. For each segment, the average speed is calcu-
lated using the distance and the time of operation. Then the track class is obtained on the
basis of FRA’s track classification (Table 3.1).
The assumed car shipments to each intermediate station, consisting of a given mix of
DG and non-DG cars, is summarized in Table 5.2. The train length 110 cars is selected
because, according to train length distributions from FRA database 1997-2006 (Figure 3.5),
the most frequent train derailments occurred for trains with 100-110 cars. Usually 10-15%
of a train consists of DG cars (Marshaling Switching course at George Brown College).
Thus, in this study, a train is assumed to consist of ten DG cars.
Table 5.2: Car shipments along the case study corridor
Distance from Total number Number of
Station rail yard (mile) of cars DG cars
Albuquerque 768 25 2
Kansas City 1663 30 3
Corwith 2100 55 5
In this application, information is needed concerning train derailment rates and causes
along each route segment. The route considered consists of six uniform segments: two
segments between the Barstow Hump Yard, and Albuquerque of lengths 169 (Barstow-
Needles), and 599 (Needles-Albuquerque) miles; three segments between Albuquerque and
Kansas City of lengths 243 (Albuquerque-Raton), 157 (Raton-Lamar), and 495 (Lamar-
Kansas City) miles; and one segment of 437 mile between Kansas City and Chicago.
5.2 Estimating Probability of Derailment by Position
Table 5.3 summarizes the derailment rates and the probability of train derailments for the
different route segments obtained by the derailment rates(per billion freight car-miles and
per million freight train-miles) from Table 3.2 and assuming that approximately 25% of all
derailments can be classified as train-mile caused and the remaining as car-mile caused.
For example, for segment 1, RC and RT are calculated using values from Table 3.2,as
follows:
RC = 7.8× 0.75 = 5.85, and RT = 0.53× 0.25 = 0.132 .
The values in the last column of Table 5.3 are calculated by utilizing the formula in
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Table 5.3: Probability of train derailment along the case study corridor
Station Seg. Distance Track Speed Train derailment rate Train Expectation of
(mile) class (mph) RC(×10−9) RT(×10−6) length train derailment
Albuquerque
1 169 4 60 5.850 0.132 110 0.131
2 599 5 80 3.670 0.080 110 0.290
Kansas City
3 243 4 60 5.850 0.132 85 0.153
4 157 5 80 3.670 0.080 85 0.061
5 495 5 80 3.670 0.080 85 0.194
Corwith 6 437 5 80 3.670 0.080 55 0.123
Equation 3.6. These values are basic estimates of the probability of train derailment along
different route segments which provide estimates of Pr(TD) in Equation (3.2).
Pr(i |TD) for a given segment is obtained from Equation (3.4) based on the POD and
the probability of a number of cars derailing. As discussed in Chapter 3, this calculation
requires information concerning the expected causes of derailment along the segment and
various train operating characteristics. According to Table 3.14, the distribution of derail-
ment causes associated with individual/specific segments can be predicted based on route
attributes and rolling stock characteristics(Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: Probability of causes of derailment for different segments along the case study
corridor
Station Segments (train length,area,track class) Cause groups
C1 C2 C3
Albuquerque
1 (2,2,1) 0.701 0.237 0.061
2 (2,2,2) 0.605 0.264 0.131
Kansas City
3 (2,2,2) 0.605 0.264 0.131
4 (2,2,1) 0.701 0.237 0.061
5 (2,1,2) 0.615 0.313 0.071
Corwith 6 (2,1,2) 0.615 0.313 0.071
To estimate Pr(POD at position j) in Equation (3.8), Table 3.12 is used. The param-
eters m1 and m2 can be obtained from Figure 3.8 for each segment (Table 5.5).
To estimate Pr(k cars derailing |POD at position j), Equation (3.10) and Table 3.15
are used. Finally, by applying Equation (3.2) the probability of car derailment by position
for a given train and track segment (Pi) can be obtained.
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Table 5.5: Membership functions of distributions based on the train length









Corwith 6 0.4 0.6
5.3 Discussion of Alternative Solutions
The involvement of DG cars in derailment depends on the DG car placement strategy. As
discussed before, a block consists of a set of cars for same destination. As discussed in
Chapter 2, the proposed solution method starts with a given order of blocks and then the
best combination of cars with in each block can be identified by minimizing the total risk.
This process repeats for each order of blocks as discussed for MDG2 in Section 2.2. In
this analysis, all six possible block sequence strategies are considered. Each block sequence
is labelled using the first letters of the destination cities. For instance, CKA means that
the first block after the engine is block A (Albuquerque), then block K (Kansas City), and
finally the last block is C (Chicago). In addition, the current sequence strategy (determined
based on destination, i.e., CKA0) is considered as the base do-noting case. As a result, the
following seven solutions are presented :
CKA0 do nothing, current operation when the order of blocks is based on interme-
diate and final destinations, and the order of cars is based on FCFS considering DG
marshalling violation (transportation of DG regulations).
CKA∗ the same as CKA0 but with the order of cars in each block determined from
the application of the proposed model.
CAK, ACK, AKC, KAC, and KCA are five other block arrangements along a train
with the order of cars determined from the application of the proposed model.
For each block placement, the risk of DG placement is obtained using Equation (3.1) for all
train positions over the entire route. From Table 5.2, only those positions that are relevant
for a given route segment with respect to the assumed shipment profile are considered in
the estimation of risk. For example, cars destined for Albuquerque (the first station along
the route) will not be considered for segments beyond this station. Thus, the train length
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varies over the route, from 110 cars traveling from the Barstow Hump Yard to Albuquerque,
85 cars to Kansas City, and 55 cars to Chicago. More details can be found in Appendix
A.
Using Evolver (genetic algorithm-based optimization software) the objective function
is to minimize the total risk considering the three following restrictions: a) total additional
time required for marshalling and switching is less than 300 minutes (five hours), b) incom-
patibility between DG cars is addressed based on the regulations, and c) the first five cars
behind the locomotive should not carry DG materials, according to US DG regulation. It
should be noted that the incompatibility between DG cars is considered within blocks and
between blocks.
Table 5.6 summarizes the case study corridor application in terms of train-wide DG
car derailments along the constituent segments from Barstow to Chicago. To estimate
the total risk value for current operation CKA0, the order of DG and non-DG cars are
allocated randomly to reflect an FCFS operation.
Table 5.6: Comparison of total risk values for optimum placement of cars in all the se-
quences of blocks
Label Risk Time
Value(×10−6) Difference(%) (min) Difference(%)
CKA0 1658 0 142 0
CKA∗ 1106 33 182 28
KCA 1172 29 225 58
CAK 1082 35 184 29
ACK 1239 25 195 37
KAC 1122 32 234 65
AKC 1176 29 227 60
The above results can be represented in terms of percent reduction in risk consider-
ing the additional rail yard train assembly time with respect to the Do-nothing strategy
(CKA0). For the case study, the results can be illustrated as in Figure 5.2.
The results suggest that more than 33% reduction in risk can be realized over the entire
route if the existing block order is maintained (i.e., CKA), but individual DG cars within
each block are positioned to reflect the in-transit risk minimizing principle. The strategy
that yields the lowest route risk corresponds to the CAK block order. The benefit of the
risk-minimum strategy (CAK) over the base case is 35% reduction in risk.
Given the rather modest risk safety gains associated with the CAK block order over the
































Figure 5.2: Comparison of risk and time percentage difference for six possible sequences of
blocks
to continue with the existing blocking order (CKA) and only restrict DG placement within
their respective blocks to the lowest risk positions.
The results obtained from optimization (Table 5.6) are compared in Figure 5.3. This
figure is quite revealing in several ways. Comparison of CKA0 and CKA∗ shows that the
latter is preferable as it reduces the risk value significantly while experiencing small increase
in train assembly time. For better understanding of these strategies, the upper left corner
of Figure 5.3 is amplified in Figure 5.4.
On the other hand, the evaluation of CKA∗ and CAK (Figure 5.4) illustrates that
allocating more time for additional operations could reduce the risk further. Obviously,
KAC, KCA, AKC, and ACK are not interesting cases as they are high-risk, high-cost
scenarios. However, it does not mean that the assessment of different possible combinations
of blocks is unnecessary as other examples have shown that in some cases they achieve
better results.
Table 5.7 illustrates the positions of the DG cars for various combinations of blocks.
These results are illusterated in Figure 5.5. The front and rear of the train is the safer
place for allocating DG cars for segments 1- 5. However, for the last segment, it seems
that the rear of the train is preferred for positing DG cars.
The Evolver setting has a runtime feature that determines the total time of the opti-
mization. There are stopping conditions that specify how and when Evolver stops during
an optimization. Once an optimization starts, the Evolver continuously runs, and searches




























































Figure 5.4: Risk and time graph of sequences of blocks excluding CKA0
Optimization runtime options includes an option when set, stops the Evolver from simu-
lating scenarios when the improvement in the target cell is less than the specified amount
(change criterion). In this case, Evolver’s answers have not improved at least 0.0001% over
the last 1000 simulations, so it assumes there is little more improvement to be found and
it stops the search. Figure 5.6 provides more details for each individual sequence of blocks.
The time spent for each optimization is reported in Table 5.8. As can be seen the average
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Table 5.7: Position of DG cars for different sequence of blocks
DG Description Position of DG Cars
DG Name UN Group Given CKA0 CKA∗ KCA CAK ACK KAC AKC
Nitrogen dioxide 1067 2 22 22 8 6 34 110 80 110
ANFO 0082 1 23 25 6 9 32 108 78 108
Cholorine 1017 3 26 42 35 110 10 10 108 85
Carbonyl sulphide 2204 2 28 32 33 109 8 6 105 83
TNT 0209 1 30 54 31 108 6 8 110 80
Nitroglycerine 0144 1 56 106 108 35 104 85 12 9
Diborane 1911 2 57 83 104 31 106 71 9 13
Hydrochloric acid 1789 4 58 74 109 32 110 84 6 6
Arsine 2188 2 60 104 106 80 107 82 10 12











Figure 5.5: Position of DG cars for different sequence of blocks






Figure 5.6: Variation of objective fuction for six block sequences
66








5.3.1 A Comparison to Other DG Placement Strategies
The following analysis is conducted to compare the results of proposed model to the other
strategies suggested by previous studies. A number of DG combination strategies are
possible. In addition to the first-come first-serve (random) option (CKA0) and CKA∗,
three other possible CKA block combinations include
1. allocating DG cars to the rear end of each block (CKA1).
2. putting DG cars at front of each block (CKA2).
3. allocating DG cars to the lowest risk slots while ignoring all the constraints (CKA3).
The first alternative is based on two previous studies [34, 57] which state that DG cars
should be placed closer to the rear. A study by FRA [40] supports the second strategy
that the preferred position for loaded cars (DG and non-DG) should be the front part of
the train. The third strategy simply ignores all the constraints and only minimizes the risk
of DG derailment.
The data in Figure 5.7 suggest that the risk would be reduced around 42% if no con-
straints are considered (CKA3). Allocating DG cars to the front of the train (CKA2) is
not recommended as it would result in the higher risk, higher cost (time). A comparison
of the strategy CKA1 and CKA∗ with CKA0 shows clearly that the CKA∗ is preferred as

























Figure 5.7: Comparison of five different marshaling strategies
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Many factors may affect the findings described in the previous section. The main objective
of this section is to investigate the potential effect of several important condition factors
on the benefits of the proposed model.
Initial Sequence of Cars
The relative benefit of the proposed model depends on the initial sequence of cars which is
random under the operation rue of the FCFS. To evaluate the impact of the initial sequence
of cars on the result of the model, in addition to the case study scenario with a given random
sequence of cars CKA0, fifteen sequences have been produced randomly. Note that in all
of these sequences, the existing block order is maintained (i.e., CKA), but individual DG
cars within each block are positioned randomly. Figure 5.8 shows the risk and time for
fifteen random sequences of cars. Each of the individual sequences in this figure can be
seen as an alternative for CKA0. There are some cases where the random placement of DG
cars do not break DG marshalling violations (crew safety, and incompatibility) and thus
in these scenarios, the blocks leave the classification yard right a way without spending
any additional time. Furthermore, there are two sequences where their associated times
are higher than the case study scenario. Relative benefit of reduced risk with regard to
higher yard costs less pronounced for trains that differ in profit from the one used in the
case study.
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Figure 5.8 could be divided into two areas upper and lower areas. It would be easy to
justify the proposed model for scenarios in the upper area as they are close to the proposed
strategy (CKA∗) in terms of time. However, it would be difficult to justify the additional
marshalling for scenarios with zero time. This analysis clearly shows that the sequence of
cars when they arrive can affect the results; therefore, implication of the proposed model


























Figure 5.8: Risk and time for fifteen random sequences of cars (CKA0)
DG Proportion
To evaluate the impact of DG proportion on the model, in addition to the case study
scenario with ten DG cars, two other scenarios are introduced with five and fifteen DG
cars, respectively. The five DG car scenario is similar to the case study scenario with
ten DG cars Table (5.7) excluding ANFO, TNT, carbonyl sulphide, arsine, and ethanol.
The last scenario includes five additional DG cars: sulfuric acid (within block A); sodium
hydroxide (within block C); and phosphoric acid, maleic anhydride, and hydrodic acid
(within block K).
The results of the proposed model for different sequences of blocks are illustrated in
Figures 5.9 and 5.10. As can be seen in 5.9, in all three scenarios, risk can be reduced at
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least by 30%. The trend shows that risk can be mitigated more when there are less DG


































Figure 5.9: Comparison of risk percentage difference for three different DG porportion





































Figure 5.10: Comparison of time percentage difference for three DG porportion scenarios
70
Size of Buffers
As discussed in Equation 4.1, DG regulations do not permit the placement of DG cars
next to an occupied locomotive. In the previous case study analysis, it is assumed that at
least five buffer cars are placed after locomotive, following the US regulation. To evaluate
the impact of this constraint on the results of proposed model, the Canadian regulation is

































Figure 5.11: Comparison of risk percentage difference for US and Canada
According to Figures 5.11, 5.12, KAC would be a better sequence of blocks to choose
if there is only one buffer. Note that, under the constraint of five buffers, the best risk
reduction strategy was CAK.
Route Attributes
The route attributes affect the results of the proposed model. To evaluate the impact, the
track class is selected for further investigation. The details of route attributes for the case
study is given in Table 5.3. Two other scenarios are generated by changing the track class
of each segment to one level higher or lower from the base scenario.
The interpretation of this result (Figure 5.13) is not easy since, for the higher track
class, the risk of derailment is supposed to be less. However, the higher track class means










































































Figure 5.13: Comparison of time percentage difference between US and Canada regulations
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explain the mixed pattern shown in the Figure 5.13. Nevertheless, the potential of the




































Figure 5.14: Comparison of time percentage difference for US and Canada
The risk associated with DG cars is sensitive to different factors, including the propor-
tion of DG cars, size of buffers, and track geometry attributes. As the number of DG cars
increase in the train consist, the potential to reduce the risk decreases. Similarly, as the
size of buffer behind the rail crew and first DG car increases, the potential to reduce the
risk decreases. These two results are likely due to the restriction of the number of available
slots for placement of DG cars. The relationship between route attributes (track class) and
risk of derailment is not straightforward because of presence of train speed (confounding
factor).
In this chapter, the proposed model is applied to a railway corridor to illustrate how
risks along a route can be used to develop cost-effective DG placement strategies at the rail
yard. The results indicate that current first-come first-serve marshaling strategies poten-
tially produce risks that may be significantly higher than the minimum risk DG placement
strategy for the particular corridor under consideration. In addition, the proposed result
has been compared with results from other suggested strategies. A sensitivity analysis has
been carried out to determine how changes in proportion of DG, buffer size, and route




This Chapter highlights the main conclusions and contributions of this thesis research and
presents directions for future work. Two basic types of conclusions are attained from this
work, academic and practical.
From an academic perspective, this research provides a unique and systematic risk-
based approach for marshalling DG cars in a train consist. The approach considers both
the probabilities of cars derailing en route by position as well as the time that is required
to change the position of cars at the rail yard.
Current regulations do not formally consider the risks of derailment by position. Hence,
there is chance that certain DG cars are located at high-risk positions along each train.
While current regulations do consider the incompatibility of materials located near each
other, they do not provide a systematic method to position DG cars in terms of their
potential for derailment and operating costs.
This research presents a unique opportunity to investigate a very important safety
problem in the rail transport sector. Based on an extensive literature review, previous
work has failed to consider the risk of DG involvement in marshalling trains carrying
different types of DG. It is expected that this work will result in a tool that can assist
rail yard operation managers to achieve an optimum trade-off between derailment risk and
operations costs in assembling trains.
Based on this research, a number of major conclusions are thus made :
• This study demonstrates that it is possible to develop a model that can suggest risk
minimization strategy for DG car placements along a train consist.
• The development of such a model requires linking derailment profiles, route at-
tributes, and rolling stock characteristics. The FRA data used in this research to
examine and validate this relationship.
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• Risk of derailment by position is found to be affected by speed, train length, derail-
ment cause and track class.
• To determine the probability of derailment by position, it is necessary to include a
complex chain of elements that include the train derailment, the cause of derailment,
the point of derailment, number of cars derailing, placement of DG cars, and sequence
of blocks.
• The effective marshalling of DG cars depends not only on the sequence of DG cars
within each block but also on the position of the blocks.
• The implementation of the proposed strategy can lead to the significant reduction in
risk for shipments of DG cars along a rail corridor.
• The benefit of reducing risk with the proposed marshalling strategy is accompanied
by increasing rail yard marshalling time. However, this additional time is modest
compared to the risk reduction. Therefore, this approach is both practical and cost
effective.
• Current DG marshalling strategy may lead to solutions with significantly higher risk
as compared to the proposed strategy. This includes one, five buffers between an
occupied locomotive and the first DG car in Canada and the US, respectively.
• The risk associated with DG cars is sensitive to different factors, including the pro-
portion of DG cars, size of buffers, and track geometry attributes. As the number of
DG cars increase in the train consist, the potential to reduce the risk is decreased.
Similarly, as the size of buffer between the rail crew and first DG car increases, the
potential to reduce the risk is decreased. These two results are likely due to the
restriction of the number of available slots for the placement of DG cars.
6.1 Major Contributions
Four important contributions are emphasized : 1) the development of a new point of
derailment model that takes into account train length and primary cause of derailment, 2)
the development of a new algorithm to calculate the yard operation time that takes into
account the number of switches and number of cars marshaled, 3) the development of an
optimization model which minimize the total risk considering DG marshalling constraint
and yard operation time, and 4) the comprehensive analysis and evaluation of various
marshalling strategies.
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6.1.1 Development of Point of Derailment Model
This study introduces a new procedure for obtaining the probability of POD. A nonpara-
metric statistical test was applied to determine whether train length and cause of derail-
ment affect POD. The test provides some basic statistical evidence that the probability of
POD along a given route segment depends on train length and the primary cause of derail-
ment. Then the best-fit distributions are obtained for all train length/cause combinations
or groupings. The uncertainty associated with distribution estimates explained by train
length membership function through fuzzy logic approach.
Finally, the probabilities for each position at which the train derailment begins can be
obtained by combinaing the probabilities estimates and membership functions.
6.1.2 Development of Algorithm to Calculate Rail Yard Opera-
tion Time
It is important from a practical point of view to understand the cost and efficiency im-
plications of different marshalling strategies as the safest strategy may not be justified if
train assembly costs are prohibitively high. The classification operation time is one of the
main factors that influence marshalling. A marshalling solution that minimizes risk could
mean additional costs as the rail crew have to cut off and couple cars to set a specific train
consist. To consider this issue, this study developes an algorithm to calculate the time
associated with additional tasks at rail yard, considering one empty track. Obviously, the
time would be reduced in case of availability two or more empty track for the operation.
This algorithm calculates the number of switching and number of cars marshalling for
each alternative. The total time can be obtained by calculating the time required for each
individual switching and movement of cars back and forth to the empty track.
6.1.3 Development Risk Based Model for Sterategic Marshalling
DG Cars
This research introduces a risk-based model for considering placement of DG railway cars
along a train. The model makes use of derailment probabilities for different railway car
positions along the train. These probabilities are affected by the speed and length of the
train and the causes of derailment for given track segments. The causes of derailment
depend on track and train operating characteristics. This study presents a procedure for
obtaining the probability of derailment by position for a given derailment cause. The
model estimates the overall risks of different DG railway car marshaling strategies subject
to destination block constraints.
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The research problem is formulated as a non-linear integer programming problem. The
resulting formula is not as a closed form as the risk term, and operational time can only be
evaluated for a given solution. A heuristic genetic algorithm is used to obtain near optimal
results.
6.1.4 Comprehensive Analysis and Evaluation of Various Mar-
shalling Strategies
An application of the model to a rail corridor is presented. The main restrictions have been
addressed in the model for the case study. According to regulations, the incompatible DG
cars must be separated by at least one buffer car. Moreover, the regulation asked for five
buffers between the locomotive and the first DG car. Furthermore, the operating time
associated with marshaling and switching was considered in placement optimization to
identify truly optimal solutions.
The results indicate that current first-come, first-serve marshaling strategies poten-
tially produce risks that may be significantly higher than the minimum risk DG placement
strategy for the particular corridor under consideration.
Finally, it should be noted that a number of assumptions are introduced in the model.
For example, all DG cars are assumed to impose the same level of hazard, while, in reality,
different DG could result in significantly different damages. Moreover, in current operation,
empty cars are assigned to the rear end of train and opposite for loaded cars to consider the
mechanical forces among cars. The underlying issue is not addressed in this study. Future
research should therefore investigate the implications of these assumptions and develop
improved models to address more realistic operating conditions.
6.2 Future Research
Train Derailment Cause Classification Model
It is recommended to conduct a study to investigate several approaches for classifying
freight train derailment causes using rolling stock attributes and route characteristics.
Combining the results from classification and log-linear analyses will improve understand-
ing of causal relationships. Predicting the cause responsible for an accident at a given track
segment and for a given train can help to estimate the probability of derailment.
It would also be valuable to investigate classification approaches (including Adaboost,
LDA, Logistic, ANN, Random Forrest, SVM, Bagging, and KNN) and evaluate their mis-
classification rates (Training Error and Testing Error) to identify the best classifier to
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perform the cause prediction of a given train and track segment. This issue is covered in
the study by Bagheri et al. [14].
Modeling Point of Derailment
Concerning the treatment of train lengths in POD modelling, a number of studies express
POD in normalized form (NPOD) to address an over-representation of front-of-train POD
in the database. While the NPOD accounts for relative train length, it fails to reflect
dynamic forces acting on the train with respect to POD that cause car-track instability
and derailment. In this study, to account for limitations in NPOD, FRA train derailments
are classified into short, medium, and long trains, and they are analyzed separately with
respect to their NPOD. To avoid using NPOD, it is recommended to develop a model that
explicitly includes train length as a predictor. This issue will be covered in the study by
Chenouri and Bagheri [25].
Modelling Number of Cars Derailed
Modeling the number of cars derailed using a truncated geometric distribution does not
seem to be realistic. Two assumptions are behind gemoteric distribution : indepency
of each individual event and equality of probability for each event. In reality, each car
derailment depends on derailing the car ahaead. In addition, the probability of derailment
for cars after POD decreases as derailment propagates due to dissipating kinetic energy.
These two concerns will be addressed in the study by Chenouri and Bagheri [24].
In-transit Risk Consequence Modelling
DG risk in this research refers to a potential derailment of cars carrying some type of DG
along a given route or route segment. Subsequent events such as releases, fires, explosions
are not considered in this analysis. Furthermore, it is assumed that the effect on total risk
resulting from the interaction of incompatible DG materials derailing in proximity to one
another can be ignored. Therefore, such that all derailing DG cars are treated equally in
terms of the potential threat they pose to population and property.
Future research should examine the implementations of all these assumptions and if
necessary extend the model to consider the subsequent events and their associated costs.
It would highlight the importance of DG cars derailments and justify the costs (time)
associated with additional switching and marshalling cars at classification tracks. In this
case, the in-transit risk and additional cost would have the similar measuring unit (for
instance, US dollar) and can be minimized together as part of the objective function.
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Modeling an Effective Buffering DG Cars
The placement of DG cars carrying different types of materials (compatible and incompat-
ible) does not formally consider all possible combinations and their associated risk. Hence,
if a derailment occurs, incompatible materials may be involved in the same derailment, so
they may compound the consequences.
In a future study, the types of DG materials and DG classes could be inputs to the
model. Pervious studies such as the chemical incompatibility guide by the American So-
ciety for Testing and Materials (ASTM) [2] which provides the chart that illustrates the
consequence of mixing different types of DG, such as heat generation, fire, explosion, etc
can be used for considering this issue. The model will assign different weights to different
types of DG based on their hazardous consequences. For example, if the consequence of
mixing two DG cars is explosion, they should be separated with a greater buffer compared
to another case that results in only heat generation. In addition, a consequence-based
ranking approach, such as Thompson et al. [57], can help compare the combination of
incompatible DG and determine the worst case. This extension will investigate the effects
of buffer size on safety benefits and costs.
Train Derailment Mechanics
In current operations, railroad companies allocate loaded cars to the front of the train
and the empty cars for the end. This practice shows the important role of mechanical
forces in train derailment. Currently, the TRAM program originated in Canada simulates
the mechanical forces for a given train consist. This program can be integrated with the





Estimation of Corridor Risks
Consider a railway corridor consisting of a rail yard, three stations and six segments, as
shown in Figure A.1. Trains originate at a rail yard and are destined for Stations 1, 2 and
3. At each destination station, a block of cars is set off from the train. Therefore, each
train consists of three blocks, labelled 1, 2, and 3, with Block 1 set off at Station 1, Block
2 at Station 2, and finally Block 3 at the final destination - Station 3.
Station 1Rail yard Station 3Station 2
R6R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Figure A.1: A rail corridor with three destinations and six segments
As mentioned, the objective of the marshaling operations is to minimize the total risk
(R), such that:
R = R1 + · · ·+R6
where R1, . . . , R6 is the total risk in six segments.
Block 1 only traverses segment one and two (s =1 and 2), while Block 2 traverses the
first five segments (s =1,...,5). Block 3 traverses all six segments (s =1,...,6) of the corridor.
This can be expressed as
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R1 = R11 +R12 +R13
R2 = R21 +R22 +R23
R3 = R32 +R33
R4 = R42 +R43
R5 = R52 +R53
R6 = R63







where Rsb is the total risk of derailment of block b in segment s. For above example
R31, R41, R51, R62, and R63 is zero.
Total risk of block b in segment s is a summation of each car risk in the block. For








2 + · · ·+Rsbnb
where Rsbi is the risk for the car at position i. As mentioned in the previous section,
the risk associated with the car at position i can be calculated from Equation (3.5)(Rsbi in




Train-mile related causes (TM) are independent of train length but depend essentially on
the number of train movements traversing a given track segment. For instance, the cause
“human error” is a train-miles related cause. On the other hand, causes such as “track
component failures” and “equipment failures” are car-miles (CM) related causes. It should
be noted that Figure B.1 is borrowed from another study [51].
83
Cause Group Description CM/TM
01T Roadbed Defects CM T001 T099
02T Non-Traffic, Weather Causes TM T002 T401 T402 T403
03T Wide Gauge CM T110 T111 T112 T113
04T Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) CM T101 T102 T103 T104 T105 T106 T107 T108 T199
05T Buckled Track CM T109
06T Rail Defects at Bolted Joint CM T201 T211
07T Joint Bar Defects CM T213 T214 T215 T216
08T Broken Rails or Welds CM T202 T203 T204 T207 T208 T210 T212 T218 T219 T220 T221
09T Other Rail and Joint Defects CM T299
10T Turnout Defects - Switches CM T307 T308 T309 T310 T311 T312 T313 T314 T315 T319
11T Turnout Defects - Frogs CM T304 T316 T317 T318
12T Misc. Track and Structure Defects CM T205 T206 T217 T222 T301 T302 T303 T305 T306 T399 T499
S001 S002 S003 S004 S005 S006 S007 S008 S009 S010 S011
S012 S013 S099
01E Air Hose Defect (Car) CM E00C
02E Brake Rigging Defect (Car) CM E07C
03E Handbrake Defects (Car) CM E08C E0HC
04E UDE (Car or Loco) CM E05C E05L
05E Other Brake Defect (Car) CM E01C E02C E03C E04C E06C E09C
06E Centerplate/Carbody Defects (Car) CM E20C E21C E22C E23C E24C E25C E26C E27C E29C
07E Coupler Defects (Car) CM E30C E31C E32C E33C E34C E35C E36C E37C E39C
08E Truck Structure Defects (Car) CM E44C E45C
09E Sidebearing, Suspension Defects (Car) CM E40C E41C E42C E43C E47C E48C
10E Bearing Failure (Car) CM E52C E53C
11E Other Axle/Journal Defects (Car) CM E51C E54C E55C E59C
12E Broken Wheels (Car) CM E60C E61C E62C E63C E6AC
13E Other Wheel Defects (Car) CM E64C E65C E66C E67C E68C E69C
14E TOFC/COFC Defects CM E11C E12C E13C E19C
E07L E40L E41L E42L E43L E44L E45L E46L E47L E48L E4TL
E49L E51L E52L E53L E54L E55L E59L E60L E61L E62L E63L
E64L E65L E66L E67L E68L E6AL E69L E70L E77L
16E Loco Electrical and Fires CM E71L E72L E73L E74L E76L
E00L E01L E02L E03L E04L E06L E08L E0HL E09L E20L E21L
E22L E23L E24L E25L E26L E27L E29L E30L E31L E32L E33L
E34L E35L E36L E37L E39L E79L E99L
18E All Other Car Defects CM E49C E80C E81C E82C E83C E84C E85C E86C E89C E99C
19E Stiff Truck (Car) CM E46C
20E Track/Train Interaction (Hunting) (Car) CM E4TC
21E Current Collection Equipment (Loco) CM E75L
H510 H511 H512 H513 H514 H515 H516 H517 H518 H519 H520
H521 H525 H526
02H Handbrake Operations TM H017 H018 H019 H020 H021 H022 H025 M504
03H Brake Operations (Other) TM H008 H099
04H Employee Physical Condition TM H101 H102 H103 H104 H199
H201 H202 H203 H204 H205 H206 H207 H208 H209 H215 H216
H217 H299
06H Radio Communications Error TM H210 H211 H212 H405
H301 H302 H303 H304 H305 H306 H307 H308 H309 H310 H311
H312 H313 H314 H315 H399
08H Mainline Rules TM H401 H402 H403 H404 H406 H499
H501 H502 H503 H504 H505 H506 H507 H508 H509 H522 H523
H524 H599
10H Train Speed TM H601 H602 H603 H604 H605 H606 H699
11H Use of Switches TM H701 H702 H703 H704 H705 H799
12H Misc. Human Factors TM H821 H822 H823 H824 H899 H991 H992 H993 H994 H995 H999
01M Obstructions TM M101 M102 M103 M104 M105 M199 M402 M403 M404
02M Grade Crossing Collisions TM M301 M302 M303 M304 M305 M306 M307 M399
03M Lading Problems CM M201 M202 M203 M204 M205 M206 M207 M299 M409 M410
04M Track-Train Interaction CM M405
05M Other Miscellaneous TM M401 M406 M407 M408 M501 M502 M503 M505 M599
09H Train Handling (excl. Brakes) TM
05H Failure to Obey/Display Signals TM
FRA Cause Codes
07H Switching Rules TM
01H Brake Operation (Main Line) TM
01S Signal Failures TM
17E All Other Locomotive Defects CM
15E Loco Trucks/Bearings/Wheels CM
 
Figure B.1: Comparison of FRA and AAR cause code groups
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Appendix C
Calibration Procedure to Estimate
the Parameters
The geometric distribution gives the probability of “x” failures before the first success 
when the probability of success at each trail is a constant probability “p”. In other words, 
the probability of “x” cars derailing before the first non-derailing car is a geometric 
distribution with the probability of a car to derail (given that a derailment has occurred), 
equal to (1-p). The general equation of the geometric distribution is 
)1()1()(  xppxXP  ...1x
In this case there is a need for truncating the range of the geometric distribution at a 
certain value before infinity. For a given derailment on a given train , the number of cars 
that could derail is restricted by the number of cars on the train. Assuming that only cars 
behind the point of derailment could derail, then the number of cars that could derail is 
actually restricted by the number of cars behind the point of derailment (Lr = residual 
length). The theoretical geometric distribution assigns probabilities for values of “x” as 
large as infinity and thus the equation of the geometric distribution should be modified. 
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Let the random variable X be the number of cars derailing in a train accident. Given the 
number of cars after POD (Lr), we have 
)1()( )1(  xppcxXP x rL,...1
































































































































































where, ),...,:()()( 943210  causesforparametersLSpeedx ri 
Train causes in the above expression were entered as dummy variables (0, 1). Speed 
(mph) and train length were given scalar values. 


































































































































The above log-likelihood function can be maximized by calibrating values for the 
parameters in the response function ix  while minimizing the negative log-likelihood 
function. The calibration is conducted using R Software (version 2.7.2). Since the above 
probability function is truncated, thus R classified the log-likelihood as user-defined 















To calibrate above log-likelihood function different algorithms such as "Nelder-Mead", 
"BFGS", "CG", "L-BFGS-B", "SANN" were applied with different initials. After 
substantial try and error most of the solutions are converged to specific value.
The summary statistics for the maximum likelihood calibration exercise are given in 
Table 3.15 for the 1997-2006 FRA accident data base. 
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Mean Number of Cars Derailed













































































































































































































































































A recent investigation [11] resulted in the similar model for the mean number of cars 




Canadian Transport Dangerous Goods (TDG) classified DG to 9 classes:
Figure D.1: Class 1 explosives
Figure D.2: Class 2 gases
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Figure D.3: Class 3 flammable liquids
Figure D.4: Class 4 flammable solids, spontaneously combustibles and substances that, on
contact with water, emit flammable gases
Figure D.5: Class 5 oxidizing substances and organic peroxides
Figure D.6: Class 6 poisonous (toxic) and infectious substances
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Figure D.7: Class 7 radioactive materials
Figure D.8: Class 8 corrosives




For this algorithm, the given and alternative combinations are assumed. This algorithm has
been coded with Visual Basic.NET. As can be seen in Figure E.1, the algorithm includes
four functions. The given and alternative combinations have been defined as two arrays
in addition to Temp as a temporary array. Two outputs, c and l, will be used to estimate
the switching and marshalling times.
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Count ()
for i =1 to n-1 
  if G[i]   A[i] 
  c = c + 4 
  Fix (i) 
next i 
Fix(i)
for j = i +1 to n





Move(G, i, n, Temp, 1) 
Move (Temp, j-i+1, n-i+1,G, i) 
Move (Temp, 1, j-I, G, i+n-j+1) 
Move (A, p, q, B, r)
for k = p to q 
B[r + k-p] =A[k] 
next k
l=l+ (q-p+1) 








%%% This Program is for P(i|TD)%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%




TL= [-2.033 1.004 0];
AREA=[1.816 0];
TRK=[-2.133 0];
cause_TL = [1.897 0.6 0; 2.312 1.117 0; 0 0 0];
cause_AREA = [0.625 0; 0.778 0; 0 0];
cause_TRK = [0.905 0; 0.65 0; 0 0];
TL_TRK=[1.891 0; 0.576 0; 0 0];





for l = 1:2
for k = 1:2
for j = 1:3
for i = 1:3
p=(exp((constant + cause(i)+ TL(j)+AREA(k)+TRK(l)+ cause_TL(i,j)+



















t_t=input(’Train type (short=1, medium=2, long=3)=’);
r_a=input(’Area (flat=1, mountain=2)=’);
t_c=input(’Track type(poor=1,good=2)=’);
if t_t ==1 & r_a==1 & t_c==1
W1=c(1);W2=c(2);W3=c(3);
elseif t_t ==2 & r_a==1 & t_c==1
W1=c(4);W2=c(5);W3=c(6);
elseif t_t ==3 & r_a==1 & t_c==1
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W1=c(7);W2=c(8);W3=c(9);
elseif t_t ==1 & r_a==2 & t_c==1
W1=c(10);W2=c(11);W3=c(12);
elseif t_t ==2 & r_a==2 & t_c==1
W1=c(13);W2=c(14);W3=c(15);
elseif t_t ==3 & r_a==2 & t_c==1
W1=c(16);W2=c(17);W3=c(18);
elseif t_t ==1 & r_a==1 & t_c==2
W1=c(19);W2=c(20);W3=c(21);
elseif t_t ==2 & r_a==1 & t_c==2
W1=c(22);W2=c(23);W3=c(24);
elseif t_t ==3 & r_a==1 & t_c==2
W1=c(25);W2=c(26);W3=c(27);
elseif t_t ==1 & r_a==2 & t_c==2
W1=c(28);W2=c(29);W3=c(30);











RT=[12.135e-6 1.515e-6 0.51e-6 0.1325e-6 0.08e-6];
RC=[540.075e-9 69.525e-9 23.625e-9 5.85e-9 3.675e-9];
P_TD=1-exp (-dis*((RC(t_c2)*t_l)+RT(t_c2)));
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%




























































































D(i)=C(i,1)*W1 + C(i,2)*W2 + C(i,3)*W3;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%



















p= (W1*pN_G1) + (W2*pN_G2) + (W3*pN_G3);
q={};
for ic = 1:t_l
for ir = 1:t_l - (ic - 1)








for j = 1:i
for x = i - j + 1:t_l - j + 1
total = total + q{j}(x);
end
pp = D(j) * total;














G.1 Visual Basic Code for Calculating Time
The following code was integrated with Evolver Software Package. The first part of the code
solves the illegal combinations (infeasible route in TSP problem) that Genetic Algorithm
(GA) produces for each iteration. The second part of the code is to calculate the time
required for switching and marshalling to make-up a train based on alternative combination
of cars.
Public n As Integer
Public c As Integer
Public l As Integer
Public g As Integer




’ Macro recorded 22/05/2009 by Admin
’
Range(Cells(1, 2), Cells(400, 2)).Value = Range(Cells(1, 1), Cells(400, 1)).Value
For ii = 1 To 23 Step 2
aa = Cells(Cells(ii, 55), 2)
bb = Cells(Cells(ii + 1, 55), 2)
Cells(Cells(ii + 1, 55), 2) = aa
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Cells(Cells(ii, 55), 2) = bb
Next
For ii = 26 To 54 Step 2
aa = Cells(Cells(ii, 55), 2)
bb = Cells(Cells(ii + 1, 55), 2)
Cells(Cells(ii + 1, 55), 2) = aa
Cells(Cells(ii, 55), 2) = bb
Next
For ii = 56 To 108 Step 2
aa = Cells(Cells(ii, 55), 2)
bb = Cells(Cells(ii + 1, 55), 2)
Cells(Cells(ii + 1, 55), 2) = aa
Cells(Cells(ii, 55), 2) = bb
Next
ThisWorkbook.Sheets("Processing").Select
Dim i As Integer
Dim s As Integer
Dim t As Integer




Range(Cells(1, 3), Cells(400, 7)).ClearContents
For t = 1 To s
n = ThisWorkbook.Sheets("Input").Cells(12 + t, 2).Value
Range(Cells(1, 7), Cells(400, 7)).Value = Range(Cells(1, 1), Cells(400, 1)).Value
c = 0
l = 0
For i = 1 To n - 1
If Cells(i + g, 7).Value <> Cells(i + g, 2).Value Then
Call fix(i)
103
c = c + 4
End If
Next i
Cells((2 * t - 1), 4).Value = c
Cells((2 * t), 4).Value = l
Cells((2 * t - 1), 5).Value = c * 1
Cells((2 * t), 5).Value = l * 0.2
Cells(z + g, 6).Value = "END"




For j = i + 1 To n
If Cells(j + g, 7).Value = Cells(i + g, 2).Value Then




Public Sub swap(i, j)
Call move(7, i, n + g, 3, 1)
Call move(3, j - i + 1, n + g - i + 1, 7, i)
Call move(3, 1, j - i, 7, i + n + g - j + 1)
End Sub
Public Sub move(a, p, q, b, r)
For k = p To q
Cells(r + k - p, b).Value = Cells(k, a).Value
Next k
l = l + (q - p + 1)
Cells(z + g, 6).Value = Str(a) + "[" + Str(p) + "," + Str(q) + "] => " +
Str(b) + "[" + Str(r) + "," + Str(r + q - p) + "]"
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